A Spanish Coin & Wayne's Forgotten Storehouse
There is however, a 4th
possibility and one that very likely could explain not only how the coin ended up in
a field near Fort Amanda, it could also support my proposal that
Gen. Anthony Wayne built a post in 1795 near the same site and
named it Head of Auglaize. This raises the question;
"did one of Wayne's soldiers drop the coin during construction of the new
post"?
The Most Likely Scenario
The following is a copy of a paper I submitted a paper to Bowling Green University - Maumee Valley Historical Society, in which I presented my proposal that General Anthony Wayne did built a post on the west bank of the Auglaize River at the site that would later become Fort Amanda. The following is a copy of my paper explaining my rational for making that proposal. I have added maps and drawings for orientation.
Wayne’s Forgotten Storehouse on the Auglaize River
David R. Johnson, MA
Fort Amanda Memorial Park in Auglaize County, Ohio marks the site
of Fort Amanda, a fortified War of 1812 supply depot constructed in November
1812 by troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Pogue. This would serve
as a departure point for navigable river transport of men and materiel into the
greater Maumee River watershed in support of General Harrison’s planned
military actions against the British and their occupation of Detroit This
article proposes that Fort Amanda was not the first fortified structure built
at that location; rather, in 1795 General Anthony Wayne had also recognized the
location’s strategic importance and constructed a post there. This theory is
supported by letters of correspondence between Wayne and Secretaries of War
Knox and Pickering. Finally, 1796
correspondence exists between Pickering and the Committee on Military
Enlistments recommending that a small garrison be installed at Wayne’s new
post. Although events surrounding Wayne’s 1792-1796 campaign in western Ohio
are well documented, this article analyzes just those events between 1793 and
1796 considered germane to the discussion. It is presented in a chronological
format.
Between 1780 and 1790,
Indians, with the aid of their British allies, had murdered over 1,500 settlers
in Kentucky and along the north side of the Ohio River. Untold
numbers of Native peoples died in the same period, one of back-and-forth
intermittent violence in this contested region. Public outcry demanded the
government take action. In 1790 General Josiah Harmar was chosen to lead a
campaign to destroy the Miami villages at KeKionga.[1] The mission
was a dismal failure. The following year General Arthur St. Clair led a
campaign to complete Harmar’s mission and his was a catastrophic failure.[2] In 1792
General Anthony Wayne was appointed Commander of the United States Army of the
Northwest. His mission was the same as his predecessors, destroy the Miami
villages. Unlike his predecessors, Wayne was not about to enter enemy territory
with ill-trained troops, so he spent the winter of 1792-93 training his army on
frontier warfare tactics at a camp in Western Pennsylvania called Legion
Ville. The army left Pennsylvania mid-April 1793 and by October, it had
advanced to within 80 miles of the Miami villages. Here the army halted on a
tributary of Stillwater Creek[3] and began
construction of Fort Greenville.[4] General
Wayne’s plan for keeping his troops supplied during the campaign to Kekionga
called for the use of contractors, a very expensive and notoriously unreliable
service. In the spring of 1794, he began looking at the feasibility of using
rivers to transport his supplies versus overland carriage using contractors. To
his north were the St. Marys and Auglaize rivers and to the east, the Great
Miami.
In early January, Wayne sent a small detachment of soldiers to reconnoiter a route from Ft. Greenville to the Auglaize River. The group stumbled into a large Indian encampment, skirmish ensued and three of his soldiers were killed. The remainder of the group returned to Fort Greenville. Wayne’s wrote the following to Secretary of War, Henry Knox Wayne regarding the incident:
January 8, 1794 - On the 2d Instant[5] Mr. Collings, A D Q Master with a serjeant corporal &
twelve privates of Capt. Eaton's, company who were sent to reconnoiter a
position between this place & Au Glaize preparatory to further operations,
came in sudden contact with a considerable Indian encampment, which they deemed
less dangerous to attack, then to attempt a retreat, after being discover’d.
The result was three privates killed on the spot, on our part and five warriors
upon theirs. When this gallant little party arrived in Camp in the course of
the next day, one of them slightly wounded in the shoulder & the
clothing of most of the others perforated by rifle balls. I have since order’d
out another detachment Under Capt. Eaton to complete the business upon which
Mr. Collings was first sent & expect his return in the course of two or
three days with some interesting information.[6]
Wayne subsequently abandoned the idea of a straight-line route from Greenville to the Auglaize fearing it would leave the flanks of his army and supply trains exposed to the enemy for nearly 50 miles.
Knowing the Great Miami River was navigable as far north as Loramie’s store Wayne sent out a second detachment to look for a route from that place to the Auglaize. What they found was the distance between those two points, Loramies and the Auglaize, was about 20 miles. Wayne knew if he could ship supplies up the Great Miami to Loramie’s store, off load them, put them on wagons and haul them 20 miles to the Auglaize, the savings in terms of safety, time and cost would be enormous.
January 18, 1794 - I have in contemplation to appoint the first of May for opening
the treaty so as to be in perfect readiness at an early period to operate with
effect should it prove abortive as well as to take advantage of the high waters
to aid our transport up the Great Miami as far as it may be found to be
navigable say to Chillakothe or rather to Loramies store at the carrying
place between the Great Miami and the Au Glaize which is computed to be 18 or
20 miles.
Up to this point, Indian forces had been playing a guessing game
with Wayne about when or even if, they would come to the negotiating table and
sign a peace treaty. Frustrated, Wayne decided to move forward and build a post
on Auglaize. This would send a clear message to the Indians that his army was
just a few miles away from their “Grand Emporium” the Glaize:
March 3, 1794 - I am determined to establish a strong post on
the banks of Au Glaize, at the north end of the portage, …. The
distance from then to Grand Glaize,[7] - at its confluence with
the Miami of the Lake,[8] is not more than from
twenty five to thirty. Miles[9] – they will therefore be
compelled to treat-fight or to abandon their towns hunting grounds &
possessions. The benefit of water transport during the spring
season, from a conviction that it is next to an impossibility to supply a large
body of troops so far advanced in an uncultivated & savage wilderness for
any length of time by means of pack Horses or land carriage only.
March 10, 1794 -
Mc Mahan found a Great part of the Ground inundated & the creeks Unfordable
from a heavy fall of rain that continued for some days- & and which
prevented him from reconnoitering the portage with effect.
March 20, 1794 -
I shall therefore make every preparation for taking ground in front, by establishing
a post on the Au Glaize at the North end of the portage as
mentioned in my letter of the 3rd Instant as soon as the waters &
circumstances will permit.[10]
Where was the “North End
of the Portage?”
The May 7 letter is very important in that it pinpoints the location of the “north end of the portage,” the point Wayne intended to build his post. It was 21 miles from Loramie's store and 35-36 miles from Pique Town.
May 7, 1794 - I must acknowledge that I have a strong prejudice in favor of a post at the North end of the portage on Au Glaize river & in favor of that route in preference to this; because at a proper season, i.e., in the spring & fall of the year, all supplies for the use of the troops & Garrisons may be transported by Water, with only twenty-one miles Land carriage, which is between the head of the navigation of the Miami of the Ohio, say at Loramies stores (about fifteen miles above the Old Chillakothe or Pique town) (Fig. 1) & even from the Chillakothe to that point on Au Glaize wou’d be but about 35 or 36 miles over a fine level open ground (Fig. 2). At all events the savages out to be removed from, or kept in check at Grand Glaize; by establishing a post at the place before mentioned- & to which a road is already Opened, it is so from situate as to be within striking distance both of Grand Glaize & Roche de Bout at the foot of the Rapids of the Miami of the Lake the distance to either of those places from that point don’t exceed Forty miles - & forms an Equilateral triangle between those three points.[11]
Notice in his May 7 letter
Wayne again writes that he intends to build a post on the Auglaize and identifies it as being 21 miles
from Loramies store and 36 miles from Piqua. The two lines merge near
Fort Amanda. The key statement is Wayne's comment, "a
road is already opened."
River Transport Plan Temporarily Put on Hold
By May 1794, the Indians had abandoned the Miami villages and
moved east, gathering in force near Grand Glaize and Roche de Boueuf.[12] With Kekionga
no longer his primary target, Wayne shifted his attentions to his new target;
Grand Glaize. The situation along the Maumee had created a sense of emergency
forcing Wayne to put into motion his plans for advancing north. His plans for a
post on the Auglaize were put on hold as the logistical issues involved had not
yet been fully developed.
Wayne’s army left Greenville in late July, took command of Grand
Glaize, marched east and defeated the Indians and their allies at Fallen
Timbers. The army marched west to the abandoned Miami villages where Wayne
built Fort
Wayne.
Post-Fallen Timbers
During his campaign, Wayne had constructed two new forts; Fort
Defiance and Fort Wayne, now those posts needed be supplied. In October, Wayne
began to focus once again on the river routes:
October 17, 1794 - The Posts in
contemplation at Chillakothe or Picque town, on the Miami of the Ohio, at
Loramies stores on the North branch & at the Old Tawa towns on the Au
Glaize, are with a view to facilitate the transport of supplies by water, and
which to a certainty will reduce the land carriage of dead or leady articles at
proper seasons i.e., late in the fall and early in the spring to thirty-five
miles and in times of freshes to twenty- in place of One Hundred & seventy
five by the most direct road to Grand Glaize & one Hundred & fifty to
the Miami villages from Fort Washington.[13]
November 12, 1794 - As soon as circumstances will admit, the posts
contemplated at Pique town, Loramies Store, & at the old Tawa Towns at the
head of the Navigation on the Au Glaize River, will be established for the
reception of & as deposits for the stores and supplies by water carriage
which is not determined to be perfectly practical in proper seasons.[14]
1795: Treaty Signing
The following year on August 3, 1795, the Treaty
of Greenville was signed. In Article 3, Section 3 of the treaty, there is a
specification that one piece six miles square at the head of the navigable
waters of the Au Glaize River was to be ceded to the United States. This area
encompassed the north end of the portage between Loramie’s Store and the
Auglaize River including the Old Tawa Town near where Wayne intended to build
his post:
September 2, 1795 - I expect in the course of a few days to
advance with the light infantry and Artificers in order to establish, a post
& store houses at the Landing on the St. Mary’s and on the Au Glaize. I
have already established one at Loramies.
September 19, 1795 - I intend as soon as the Equinoctial[15] storm is over to advance
with the light infantry & artificers to the landing on St. Mary's, in order
to erect a post & storehouse at that place. I shall also reconnoiter a
position on the Au Glaize to determine whether a post will be established at
that place or not, if I find that it will be of real advantage, I shall also
establish one on that river within the reservation.[16]
Severe storms beginning mid-September and lasting through the end of the month kept Wayne from reconnoitering the north end of the portage. By October 5, storms and heavy rains had subsided and Wayne headed north to reconnoiter a route between Loramie’s store and the St. Marys River. He planned to build a post or storehouses on the St. Marys then travel over to the Auglaize to determine if a post there would be valuable:
October 5, 1795 - I shall mount my horse in the course of a few Minutes in order to overtake the troops now in full March to establish the post or posts mentioned in my letter of the 19th Ultimo.[17]
November 9, 1795 - I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your several letters of the 26th of September, the 3rd, 10th and 17th of October. The last three came to hand whilst I was on the tour & duty mentioned in my letters of the 19th of September and 5th Ultimo , and from which I returned a few days since, after completing a chain of posts & storehouses at St. Mary's - Loramies & the old Chillakothe near the confluence of the North & East branches of the Miami of the Ohio.[18]
Wayne left Greenville on October 5 and returned the first week of
November. In his November 9 letter to Pickering, Wayne wrote that he completed
a chain of posts at St. Marys, Loramies and Piqua, In at least eleven of his
previous letters, Wayne had expressed intense interest in building a post on
the Auglaize yet he makes no mention of doing so in this letter. The reason, is
simple: he had not built it…yet!.
On November 18, Wayne wrote Pickering advising against transmitting dispatches by water, particularly the Ohio River that late in the season because of ice blockages on the rivers. He indicated the following:
The season being so far advanced I do not think it safe to commit the dispatches as herewith transmitted – by Water to Pittsburgh - as is more than probably the boat wou’d be impeded if not totally stopped by the ice.[19]
1796: Post-Treaty Events
On February 3, 1796, Secretary of War Pickering,
submitted a report to the Committee on Military Establishments listing the
frontier posts he and General Wayne recommended retain a military presence of
various kinds. A section of that report read:
In
applying the military force to these objects, I have thrown the posts to be
occupied into divisions, in each of which there will be a principal station for
the ordinary residence of the Commandant of the division. One battalion will
occupy one of these divisions, and a sub-legion three of them. The Lieutenant
Colonel will take a station the most convenient for superintending his
sub-legion. A general officer will find abundant employment in visiting and
regulating all the posts. Beyond question, the military posts we must occupy,
on our frontiers, will be numerous, though the garrison will be small.
INTERESTING NOTE:
On Nov. 9, 1795 Wayne wrote that he had "completed a chain of posts & storehouses at St. Marys - Loramies & old Chilakothe. In Pickering's lists of posts to be occupied, the Greenville district lists, Jefferson, Greenville, Recovery and Adams as a "fort" whereas Loramies and Head of Navigation are not. Wayne never refers to Loramie's as a fort nor does he about Head of Auglaize inferring that both places were storehouses and not forts.
Posts to Be Occupied and Troop Distribution[20]
Head of Auglaize
Pickering’s list of military stations to be occupied does not
include Fort St. Marys. On the other hand, it does include one called
“Head of Auglaize. The reason St. Marys is not mentioned is because Wayne
closed it the latter part of 1795. A question that emerges is “why did he close
the post on the St. Marys River and build one on the Auglaize?"
Perhaps the best answer can be found in excerpts from
letters written in 1795 and 1812 describing the condition of both rivers in
winter. On November 18, 1795 in a letter to Pickering, Wayne wrote:
The season being so far
advanced I do not think it safe to commit the dispatches as herewith
transmitted – by Water to Pittsburgh - as is more than probably the boat wou’d
be impeded if not totally stopped by the ice.[21]
Seventeen years later, Major Thomas Bodley sent
a message to General William Henry Harrison describing in great detail the poor
conditions of the St. Marys River and the difficulties it presented while
trying to getting supplies to Fort Wayne. The following are excerpts from the
December 11, 1812 message to Harrison:
A messenger arrived with information that the last boats were
stopped by the ice below this about 40 miles by water and about 12 by land that
they had used every exertion but could proceed no further and in the Evening
our express arrived from the first boats that they got to Shane’s Crossing
about 60 miles by water and 18 by land from this place where they were frozen up
and no possibility of them getting on. There was no alternative left but to
secure the craft and properly which Col. Barbee taken every necessary step to
effect Captain Jordan’s company remain with the first boats and to build
storehouses etc.
The roads are so extremely bad and the waters have been so high as
to render it impossible for wagons or horses to travel.
The St. Marys is so extremely crooked and blocked up with drift
wood in many places where its out of the Bank and overflowed for miles in short
terns. The slush has collected and frozen solid so as to dam it up for miles.
Consequently, nothing but a general thaw or hard rains can give us the benefit
of the navigation of this stream. The Auglaize is much straighter, has more
water and will not freeze up as soon as the St. Marys.[22]
Nineteen Years Later - 1813
August 30, 1813 --Started early got to St. Marys to Breakfast campt on the bank of the river opposite the fort, & drew some forage provision, & camp equipage and then by the direction of the Col. moved on to Fort Amanda on the Auglaise twelve miles, where we arrived late in the evening & crossed the river at the fort and campt in an open field on a hill half a mile from the fort called the Ottowa village destroyed by Genl. Wayne in the year 1794, & in the night our horses were alarmed & we lost several that ran off this day it rained upon us our business at present will be to guard Military stores on to Ft. Meigs where we will join the main N. W. Army.
Concluding Remarks
In his November 9,, 1795 letter
to Secretary of War Pickering, Wayne wrote that during the month of October, he
had completed a chain of posts at St. Marys, Loramie’s store and Piqua, and yet
despite his intense interest in building a post on the Auglaize, he made no
mention of building one there. The reason: he decided to use the St. Marys
River to transport supplies to Fort Wayne and Fort Defiance. All went well
during the summer months of 1795 however, winter conditions that year basically
closed the St. Marys. Conditions of the rivers were so poor, Wayne even suggested
messages between himself and Pickering be carried by hand overland to avoid
being frozen in one of the main rivers.
As Major Bodley pointed out in his letter to
General Harrison, the Auglaize was much straighter, was deeper and was not
as quick to freeze up as the St. Marys. Simply put, Wayne had no choice. The
proposal is sometime between the end of November 1795 and January 1796 Wayne
built Head of Auglaize at the north end of the portage between Laramie’s store
and the Auglaize River, not out of preference, but out of necessity.
Seventeen years later, General William Henry
Harrison, Commander of the Army of the Northwest, who as a young man served an
aide-de-camp to General Wayne during his Fallen Timbers campaign, returned to
the “north end of the portage” and built Fort Amanda in the same area Wayne had
chosen for Head of Auglaize. Was this merely a coincidence, or did this reflect
Harrison’s prior familiarity with Wayne’s campaign?
The above is my proposal that General Anthony Wayne built a storehouse in 1795 on the west bank of the Auglaize River that served as a supply depot for materials being shipped north to supply troops at Fort Defiance. He named it Head of Auglaize. The site was of such strategic importance that seventeen years later, during the War of 1812, General Harrisons built a fort at or near the same site, Fort Amanda and used for the same purpose. As for the Spanish Reale coin discovered at Fort Amanda and the fact that more than 40 have been discovered at another of Wayne's sites (Loramie store), one must wonder if the coin could have been dropped by one of General Wayne's soldiers during construction of Head of Auglaize. Hopefully the work done later this year by Greg Shipley and his team at Fort Amanda will shed some light on whether all this. If what I've proposed in this blog proves true, it will change the whole narrative of the history of the area and open many more opportunities for future study.
References
American State Papers,
House of Representatives, 4th Congress, 1st Session. Military Affairs:
Volume 1, Pg 2. 113-114.
Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Ky. Bodley Family. Papers, 1773-1939.
Call No.: Mss. A B668e 154.
Knopf, Richard C. “Anthony Wayne – A Name in Arms,” Library of Congress Catalog
Card Number: 59-1524, 1959, ISBN: 13:978-0-8229-8359-0.
[1] Kekionga was a major Miami village at
the branch of the St. Joseph and Maumee Rivers in present-day Fort Wayne,
Indiana.
[2] The battle is referred to today as “St.
Clair’s Defeat.”
[3] Greenville River.
[4] Present-day Greenville, Ohio.
[5] “Instant”: in this usage, the term
refers to a recent occurrence in the present or current month.
[6] Knopf, 288
[7] Present-day Defiance, Ohio.
[8] Early name used by white settlers for
the Maumee River.
[9] Wayne estimated the distance from the
north end of the portage to Grand Glaize to be 25 to 30 miles. The actual “as
the crow flies” distance is 41 miles.
[10] Knopf, 312 .
[11] Knopf, 325
[12] Present-day Waterville, Ohio.
[13] Present-day Cincinnati, Ohio.
[14] Knopf, 363 .
[15] Equinoctial storms are violent winds or
rains occurring at or near the time of an equinox.
[16] Knopf, 459
[17] In this usage “Ultimo” means an event
that took place the previous month.
[18] Knopf, 468
[19] Knopf, 472
[20] American State Papers, House of Representatives, 4th Congress, 1st
Session. Military Affairs: Volume 1, Pg 2. 113-114.
[21] Knopf, 472
[22] Bodley Family. Papers, 1773-1939
