Saturday, June 4, 2022

Anthony Wayne's Forgotten Post on the Auglaize

 

Wayne’s Forgotten Post on the Auglaize River

David R. Johnson, MA

 

  NOTE: I submitted the following paper to Bowling Green State University in April of 2022.  It will be published later this year in "Northwest Ohio Quarterly."  The paper presents, what I considier, a very compelling argument that in 1794-1795, General Anthony Wayne built a post at or very near the site of Fort Amanda.  This blog is much longer than previous posts but it is necessary to help support my claim.  

 

 

Fort Amanda Memorial Park in Auglaize County, Ohio marks the site of Fort Amanda, a fortified War of 1812 supply depot constructed in November 1812 by troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Pogue. This would serve as a departure point for navigable river transport of men and materiel into the greater Maumee River watershed in support of General Harrison’s planned military actions against the British and their occupation of Detroit. This article proposes that Fort Amanda was not the first fortified structure built at that location; rather, in 1795 General Anthony Wayne had also recognized the location’s strategic importance and constructed a post there. This theory is supported by letters of correspondence between Wayne and Secretaries of War Knox and Pickering. Finally, 1796 correspondence exists between Pickering and the Committee on Military Enlistments recommending that a small garrison be installed at Wayne’s new post. Although events surrounding Wayne’s 1792-1796 campaign in western Ohio are well documented, this article analyzes just those events between 1793 and 1796 considered germane to the discussion. It is presented in a chronological format.

Between 1780 and 1790, Indians, with the aid of their British allies, had murdered over 1,500 settlers in Kentucky and along the north side of the Ohio River.  Untold numbers of Native peoples died in the same period, one of back-and-forth intermittent violence in this contested region. Public outcry demanded the government take action. In 1790 General Josiah Harmar was chosen to lead a campain to destroy the Miami villages at KeKionga.[1] The mission was a dismal failure. The following year General Arthur St. Clair led a campaign to complete Harmar’s mission and his was a catastrophic failure.[2] In 1792 General Anthony Wayne was appointed Commander of the United States Army of the Northwest. His mission was the same as his predicessors, destroy the Miami villages. Unlike his predecessors, Wayne was not about to enter enemy territory with ill-trained troops, so he spent the winter of 1792-93 training his army on frontier warfare tactics at a camp in Western Pennsylvania called Legion Ville. The army left Pennsylvania mid-April 1793 and by October it had advanced to within 80 miles of the Miami villages. Here the army halted on a tributary of Stillwater Creek[3] and began construction of Fort Greenville.[4] General Wayne’s plan for keeping his troops supplied during the campaign to Kekionga called for the use of contractors, a very expensive and notoriously unreliable service. In the spring of 1794, he began looking at the feasibility of using rivers to transport his supplies versus overland carriage using contractors. To his north were the St. Marys and Auglaize rivers and to the east, the Great Miami.

In early January Wayne sent a small detachment of soldiers to reconnoiter a route from Ft. Greenville to the Auglaize River. The group stumbled into a large Indian encampment, skirmish ensued and three of his soldiers were killed. The remainder of the group returned to Fort Greenville. Wayne’s wrote the following to Secretary of War, Henry Knox Wayne regarding the incident:

January 8, 1794 - On the 2d Instant[5] Mr. Collings, A D Q Master with a serjeant corporal & twelve privates of Capt. Eaton's, company who were sent to reconnoiter a position between this place & Au Glaize preparatory to further operations, came in sudden contact with a considerable Indian encampment, which they deemed less dangerous to attack, then to attempt a retreat, after being discover’d. The result was three privates killed on the spot, on our part and five warriors upon theirs. When this gallant little party arrived in Camp in the course of the next day, one of them slightly wounded in the shoulder  & the clothing of most of the others perforated by rifle balls. I have since order’d out another detachment Under Capt. Eaton to complete the business upon which Mr. Collings was first sent & expect his return in the course of two or three days with some interesting information.[6]

 

Wayne subsequently abandoned the idea of a straight-line route from Greenville to the Auglaize fearing it would leave the flanks of his army and supply trains exposed to the enemy for nearly 50 miles. Knowing the Great Miami River was navigable as far north as Loramie’s store Wayne sent out a second detachment to look for a route from that place; (to the Auglaize. What they found was the distance between those two points, Loramies and the Auglaize, was about 20 miles. Wayne knew if he could ship supplies up the Great Miami to Loramie’s store, off load them, put them on wagons and haul them 20 miles to the Auglaize, the savings in terms of safety, time and cost would be enormous.

January 18, 1794 - I have in contemplation to appoint the first of May for opening the treaty so as to be in perfect readiness at an early period to operate with effect should it prove abortive as well as to take advantage of the high waters to aid our transport up the Great Miami as far as it may be found to be navigable say to Chillakothe or rather to Loramies store at the carrying place between the Great Miami and the Au Glaize which is computed to be 18 or 20 miles.  

 

Up to this point, Indian forces had been playing a guessing game with Wayne in regard to when or even if, they would come to the negotiating table and sign a peace treaty. Frustrated, Wayne decided to move forward and build a post on Auglaize. This would send a clear message to the Indians that his army was just a few miles away from their “Grand Emporium” the Glaize:

March 3, 1794 - I am determined to establish a strong post on the banks of Au Glaize, at the north end of the portage, …. The distance from then to Grand Glaize,[7] - at its confluence with the Miami of the Lake,[8] is not more than from twenty five to thirty Miles[9] – they will therefore be compelled to treat-fight or to abandon their towns hunting grounds & possessions.

                        .  

March 10, 1794 - Mc Mahan found a Great part of the Ground inundated & the creeks Unfordable from a heavy fall of rain that continued for some days- & and which prevented him from reconnoitering the portage with effect.

 

March 20, 1794 - I shall therefore make every preparation for taking ground in front, by establishing a post on the Au Glaize at the North end of the portage as mentioned in my letter of the 3rd Instant as soon as the waters & circumstances will permit.[10]

 

Where was the “North End of the Portage?”

The May 7 letter is very important in that it pinpoints the location of the “north end of the portage,” the point Wayne intended to build his post. It was 21 miles from Loramies and 35-36 miles from Pique Town:

May 7, 1794 - I must acknowledge that I have a strong prejudice in favor of a post at the North end of the portage on Au Glaize river & in favor of that route in preference to this; because at a proper season, i.e., in the spring & fall of the year, all supplies for the use of the troops & Garrisons may be transported by Water, with only twenty-one miles Land carriage, which is between the head of the navigation of the Miami of the Ohio, say at Loramies stores (about fifteen miles above the Old Chillakothe or Pique town) (Fig. 1) & even from the Chillakothe to that point on Au Glaize wou’d be but about 35 or 36 miles over a fine level open ground (Fig. 2).  At all events the savages out to be removed from, or kept in check at Grand Glaize; by establishing a post at the place before mentioned- & to which a road is already Opened, it is so from situate as to be within striking distance both of Grand Glaize & Roche de Bout at the foot of the Rapids of the Miami of the Lake the distance to either of those places from that point don’t exceed Forty miles - & forms an Equilateral triangle between those three points.[11]

 



   

     Figure 1                                                               Figure 2

 

 

River Transport Plan Temporarily Put on Hold

By May 1794, the Indians had abandoned the Miami villages and moved east, gathering in force near Grand Glaize and Roche de Boueuf.[12] With Kekionga no longer his primary target, Wayne shifted his attentions to his new target; Grand Glaize. The situation along the Maumee had created a sense of emergency forcing Wayne to put into motion his plans for advancing north. His plans for a post on the Auglaize were put on hold as the logistical issues involved had not yet been fully developed.

Wayne’s army left Greenville in late July, took command of Grand Glaize, marched east and defeated the Indians and their allies at Fallen Timbers. The army marched west to the abandoned Miami villages where Wayne built Fort Wayne.                             

Post-Fallen Timbers

During his campaign, Wayne had constructed two new forts; Fort Defiance and Fort Wayne, now those posts needed be supplied. In October, Wayne began to focus once again on the river routes:

October 17, 1794 - The Posts in contemplation at Chillakothe or Picque town, on the Miami of the Ohio, at Loramies stores on the North branch & at the Old Tawa towns on the Au Glaize, are with a view to facilitate the transport of supplies by water, and which to a certainty will reduce the land carriage of dead or leady articles at proper seasons i.e., late in the fall and early in the spring to thirty-five miles and in times of freshes to twenty- in place of One Hundred & seventy five by the most direct road to Grand Glaize & one Hundred & fifty to the Miami villages from Fort Washington.[13]

                                                           

November 12, 1794 - As soon as circumstances will admit, the posts contemplated at Pique town, Loramies Store, & at the old Tawa Towns at the head of the Navigation on the Au Glaize River, will be established for the reception of & as deposits for the stores and supplies by water carriage which is not determined to be perfectly practical in proper seasons.[14]

 

1795: Treaty Signing

The following year on August 3, 1795 the Treaty of Greenville was signed. In Article 3, Section 3 of the treaty, there is a specification that one piece six miles square at the head of the navigable waters of the Au Glaize River was to be ceded to the United States. This area encompassed the north end of the portage between Loramie’s Store and the Auglaize River including the Old Tawa Town where Wayne intended to build his post:

September 2, 1795 - I expect in the course of a few days to advance with the light infantry and Artificers in order to establish, a post & store houses at the Landing on the St. Mary’s and on the Au Glaize. I have already established one at Loramies.

 

September 19, 1795 - I intend as soon as the Equinoctial[15] storm is over to advance with the light infantry & artificers to the landing on St. Mary's, in order to erect a post & storehouse at that place. I shall also reconnoiter a position on the Au Glaize to determine whether a post will be established at that place or not, if I find that it will be of real advantage, I shall also establish one on that river within the reservation.[16]

 

Severe storms beginning mid-September and lasting through the end of the month kept Wayne from reconnoitering the north end of the portage. By October 5 storms and heavy rains had subsided and Wayne headed north to reconnoiter a route between Loramie’s store and the St. Marys River.  He planned to build a post or storehouses on the St. Marys then travel over to the Auglziae to determine if a post there would be valuable:  

October 5, 1795 - I shall mount my horse in the course of a few Minutes in order to overtake the troops now in full March to establish the post or posts mentioned in my letter of the 19th Ultimo.[17]

 

November 9, 1795 - I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your several letters of the 26th of September, the 3rd, 10th and 17th of October. The last three came to hand whilst I was on the tour & duty mentioned in my letters of the 19th of September and 5th Ultimo , and from which I returned a few days since, after completing a chain of posts & storehouses at St. Mary's - Loramies & the old Chillakothe near the confluence of the North & East branches of the Miami of the Ohio.[18]

 

Wayne left Greenville on October 5 and returned the first week of November. In his November 9 letter to Pickering, Wayne wrote that he completed a chain of posts at St. Marys, Loramies and Piqua, In at least eleven of his previous letters, Wayne had expressed intense interest in building a post on the Auglaize yet he makes no mention of doing so in this letter. The reason, is simple: he had not built it…yet!.   

On November 18, Wayne wrote Pickering advising against transmitting dispatches by water, particularly the Ohio River that late in the season because of ice blockages on the rivers. He indicated the following:

The season being so far advanced I do not think it safe to commit the dispatches as herewith transmitted – by Water to Pittsburgh - as is more than probably the boat wou’d be impeded if not totally stopped by the ice.[19]

 

1796: Post-Treaty Events

On February 3, 1796, Secretary of War Pickering, submitted a report to the Committee on Military Establishments listing the frontier posts he and General Wayne recommended retain a military presence of various kinds. A section of that report read:

In applying the military force to these objects, I have thrown the posts to be occupied into divisions, in each of which there will be a principal station for the ordinary residence of the Commandant of the division. One battalion will occupy one of these divisions, and a sub-legion three of them. The Lieutenant Colonel will take a station the most convenient for superintending his sub-legion. A general officer will find abundant employment in visiting and regulating all the posts. Beyond question, the military posts we must occupy, on our frontiers, will be numerous, though the garrison will be small.


  Posts to Be Occupied and Troop Distribution[20]


Pickering’s list of military stations to be occupied does not include Fort St. Marys. On the other hand it does include one called “Head of Auglaize. The reason St. Marys is not mentioned is because Wayne closed it the latter part of 1795. A question that emerges is “why did he close the post on the St. Marys River and build one on the Auglaize?”  Perhaps the  best answer can be found in excerpts from letters written in 1795 and 1812 describing the condition of both rivers in winter. On November 18, 1795 in a letter to Pickering, Wayne wrote:

The season being so far advanced I do not think it safe to commit the dispatches as herewith transmitted – by Water to Pittsburgh - as is more than probably the boat wou’d be impeded if not totally stopped by the ice.[21]

 

Seventeen years later, Major Thomas Bodley sent a message to General William Henry Harrison describing in great detail the poor conditions of the St. Marys river and the difficulties it presented while trying to getting supplies to Fort Wayne. The following are excerpts from the December 11, 1812 message to Harrison:

A messenger arrived with information that the last boats were stopped by the ice below this about 40 miles by water and about 12 by land that they had used every exertion but could proceed no further and in the Evening our express arrived from the first boats that they got to Shanes Crossing about 60 miles by water and 18 by land from this place where they were frozen up and no possibility of them getting on. There was no alternative left but to secure the craft and properly which Col. Barbee taken every necessary step to effect Captain Jordan’s company remain with the first boats and to build storehouses etc.

 

The roads are so extremely bad and the waters have been so high as to render it impossible for wagons or horses to travel.

 

The St. Marys is so extremely crooked and blocked up with drift wood in many places where its out of the Bank and overflowed for miles in short terns. The slush has collected and frozen solid so as to dam it up for miles. Consequently nothing but a general thaw or hard rains can give us the benefit of the navigation of this stream. The Auglaize is much straighter, has more water and will not freeze up as soon as the St. Marys.[22]

 

Concluding Remarks

In his November 9,, 1795 letter to Secretary of War Pickering, Wayne wrote that during the month of October, he had completed a chain of posts at St. Marys, Loramie’s store and Piqua, and yet despite his intense interest in building a post on the Auglaize, he made no mention of building one there. The reason: he decided to use the St. Marys River to transport supplies to Fort Wayne and Fort Defiance. All went well during the summer months of 1795 however, winter conditions that year basically closed the St. Marys. Conditions of the rivers were so poor, Wayne’s even suggested messages between himself and Picekring be hand overland to avoid being frozen in one of the main rivers.

As Major Bodley pointed out in his letter to General Harrison, the Auglaize was much straighter, was deeper and was not as quick to freeze up as the St. Marys. Simply put, Wayne had no choice. The proposal is sometime between the end of November 1795 and January 1796 Wayne built Head of Auglaize at the north end of the portage between Laramie’s store and the Auglaize River, not out of preference, but out of necessity.

Seventeen years later, General William Henry Harrison, Commander of the Army of the Northwest, who as a young man served an aide-de-camp to General Wayne during his Fallen Timbers campaign, returned to the “north end of the portage” and built Fort Amanda in the same area Wayne had chosen for Head of Auglaize. Was this merely a coincidence, or did this reflect Harrison’s prior familiarity with Wayne’s campaign?

 

 



[1] Kekionga was a major Miami village at the branch of the St. Joseph and Maumee Rivers in present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana.

[2] The battle is referred to today as “St. Clair’s Defeat.”

[3] Greenville River.

[4] Present-day Greenville, Ohio.

[5] “Instant”: in this usage, the term refers to a recent occurrence in the present or current month.

[6] Knopf, 288

[7] Present-day Defiance, Ohio.

[8] Early name used by white settlers for the Maumee River.

[9]  Wayne estimated the distance from the north end of the portage to Grand Glaize  to be 25 to 30 miles.   The actual “as the crow flies” distance is 41 miles.

[10] Knopf, 312           .

[11] Knopf, 325         

[12] Present-day Waterville, Ohio.

[13] Present-day Cincinnati, Ohio.

[14] Knopf, 363      .

[15] Equinoctial storms are violent winds or rains occurring at or near the time of an equinox.

[16] Knopf, 459   

[17] In this usage “Ultimo” means an event that took place the previous month.

[18] Knopf, 468    

[19] Knopf, 472      

 

[20] American State Papers, House of Representatives, 4th Congress, 1st Session.  Military Affairs:  Volume 1,

               Pg 2. 113-114.   

[21] Knopf, 472        

[22] Bodley Family. Papers, 1773-1939

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