Let's See Who Blinks First

 

Fallen Timbers Battlefield

Most history buffs are familiar with the Battle Of Fallen Timbers in 1794.  What they may not be as familiar with is an incident that took place immediately after the battle, one that could have easily resulted in a second war with England. It also created a situation that marked the beginning of the end for the Indian/British alliance in North America.

Third Times a Charm

During a ten-year period (1780 -1790) over 1500 settlers living along the Ohio river had been murdered by Indians. In an effort to stop the carnage, President Washington ordered Gen. Josiah Harmar to assemble an army, march north and destroy the Indian stronghold at Kekionga (Fort Wayne Indiana). His campaign was a miserable failure. The following year (1791) Washington gave the same order to Gen. Arthur St. Clair.  St. Clair's army was obliterated on Nov. 4th with a defeat recognized as the worse defeat of an American army at the hands of Native Americans (St. Clair's Defeat). 

Still intent on destroying Kekionga, Washington next ordered Gen. Anthony Wayne to complete the mission. Wayne spent 1792 and 1793 training troops to fight on the frontier and negotiating with contractors to assure his supply chain was in place. He was not about to make the same mistakes as his predecessors. Wayne was a micro-manager, a man Chief Little Turtle called, "the chief who never sleeps."

Gen. Anthony Wayne 

 

"Oh Oh......Here he comes.”

The British were well aware of the 2 previous campaigns against Kekionga and that a 3rd attack was on its way. What they feared most was that once Kekionga was in American hands, the Americans would attack the British stronghold at Detroit.  As a precaution and seeing themselves as a first line defense for Detroit, in the Spring of 1794 Major William Campbell and his 200-man force began construction of a fort in on the north bank of the Maumee River and named it Fort Miami.  

    

Fort Miami  (Scale Comparison)

What they didn't know was Wayne had no intention of attacking Detroit, his sole focus was on gaining control of the Indians along the Maumee River.  What they also did not know was that Wayne had been authorized by the Secretary of War to "dislodge" the British from the fort if in the course of his operation he felt it was necessary. The instructions were:

"If in the course of your operatiopns against the Indian enemy, it should become necessary to dsislodge the party [the British garrison], you are hereby authorized in the name of the president of the United States to do so.

 

August 20, 1794

 

On the morning of August 20, 1794, Wayne's army advanced along the northside of the Maumee River and arrived at a clearing littered with fallen trees apparently felled and uprooted by a tornado or huge windstorm that had passed through the area.    Wayne’s force of 3000 regulars, militia, and Indian spies immediately engaged the enemy force of 1500 being led by Blue Jacket, Buckendahls and Tecumseh.

Rule #1 - Never Go Into Battle With an Empty Stomach

Aside from being outnumbered 2 to 1, the enemy was under another distinct disadvantage, hunger.  It was common practice among the Indians to fast before a battle because if shot in the stomach with food in it, there was a danger of infections.  Thinking Wayne’s army would arrive on the 19^th the Indians had not eaten for two days. They also thought the fallen trees would hinder the armies advance, instead, Wayne flanked them with his cavalry while his infantry pushed on with fixed bayonets.  The ensuing fight lasted only a few minutes.  Wayne’s losses were 33 killed and 100 wounded.  The enemy losses were 30 to 40 Indians and Canadians killed.   The number of enemy wounded remains unknown as those able to leave the field either swam across the Maumee River or retreated along with the river back toward Ft. Miami, the British fort 4 miles to the east. 

Major William Campbell, the British commandant at Fort Miami, could hear the cannon and small arms fire 4 miles to his west.    Fearing Wayne was on his way to attack his fort,  Major Campbell ordered that his defensive obstacles, abatis and Che Vaux de Frise be put into place.

   
                  Abatis                                                  Che Vaux de Frise

Arriving back at Ft. Miami, the retreating Indians were met with a very unpleasant surprise.  The gates were locked, and they were told to hide somewhere else. Angry and disgusted, many ran into the nearby woods while others jumped into the river and swam to the opposite side.  Meanwhile, Wayne was rushing headlong toard the British post. 

 

Meanwhile at the battlefield, the smoke and chaos had ended, and the Indians and their allies had fled the field,  General Wayne reassembled his troops, tended to the wounded and began burying the dead. The following day he marched his army 4 miles to the east and set up camp less than a mile from the British fort.  

Aug. 21, 1794 - Seeing the American army camped withing shouting distance from his fort, Major Campbell sent a messenger with a white flag with a letter for General Wayne.   

 NOTE:  The following chain of letters exchanged between General Wayne and Major Campbell is written in the language of the day and as you'll see, "very flowery and wordy."  I transcribed them using modern day vernacular and included them at the end of the chain.

Major Campbell’s letter to Gen. Wayne:    

"Sir: An army of the United States of America, said to be under your command, having taken post on the banks of the Miami for upwards of the last twenty-four hours, almost within the reach of the guns of this fort, being a post belonging to His Majesty the King of Great Britain, occupied by his Majesty's troops, it becomes my duty to inform myself as speedily as possible in what light I am to view your making such near approaches to this garrison. I have no hesitation on my part to say that I know of no war existing between Great Britain and America."

General Wayne’s response back to Major Campbell:  

"Sir: I have received your letter of this date requiring from me the motives which have moved the army under my command to the position they at present occupy, far within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the United States of America. Without questioning the authority, or propriety, sir, of your interrogatory, I think I may, without breach of decorum, observe to you that, were you entitled to an answer, the most full and satisfactory one was announced to you from the muzzles of my small arms yesterday morning in the action against the horde of savages in the vicinity of your post, which terminated gloriously to the American arms; but had it continued until the Indians, &c., were driven under the influence of the post and guns you mention, they would not have much impeded the progress of the victorious army under my command, as no such post was established at the commencement of the present war between the Indians and the United States the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your most obedient and humble servant."

In the early morning of August 22 General Wayne slowly approached the fort alone on horseback. When he was within pistol range, he dismounted and walked around the entire perimeter of the fort all the while hurling insults at the soldiers behind its walls and making unflattering comments about their flag.

Major Campbell’s reaction to General Wayne.   

"Although your letter of yesterday's date fully authorizes me to any act of hostility against the army of the United States of America in this neighborhood under your command, yet, still anxious to prevent that dreadful decision which, perhaps, is not intended to be appealed to by either of our countries, I have forborne, for those two days past, to resent those insults you have offered to the British flag flying at this fort, by approaching it within pistol shot of my works, not only singly, but in numbers, with arms in their hands. Neither is it my wish to wage war with individuals; but should you, after this, continue to approach my post in the threatening manner you are at this moment doing, my indispensable duty to my King and country, and the honor of my profession, will oblige me to have recourse to those measures which thousands of either nation may hereafter have cause to regret, and which, I solemnly appeal to God, I have used my utmost endeavors to arrest."

 General Wayne’s response to Major Campbell:   

"taking post far within the well-known and acknowledged limits of the United States, and erecting a fortification in the heart of the settlement of the Indian tribes now at war with the United States. Hence, it becomes my duty to desire, and I do hereby desire and demand, in the name of the President of the United States, that you immediately desist from any further act of hostility or aggression, by forbearing to fortify, and removing to the nearest post occupied by his Britannic Majesty's at the peace of 1783, and which you will be permitted to do unmolested by the troops under my command. 

 Major Campbell’s response to General Wayne.   

"I certainly will not abandon this post at the summons of any power whatever, until I receive orders from those, I have the honor to serve under or the fortunes of war should oblige me. I must still adhere, sir, to the purport of my letter this morning, to desire that your army, or individuals belonging to it, will not approach within reach of my cannon, without expecting the consequences attending it." 

The letters exchanged between Wayne and Campbell were written in the language of the day and contained 633 words.  Written in a modern language, the exchange would contain 237 words.   

 Campbell - "Your army set up a camp close to my fort. We're not at war with the United States so what's that all about?  

Wayne - "First of all our camp is within the jurisdiction of the United States.  Secondly, one would think the sounds of a battle yesterday would have been a clue as to what's going on and thirdly, had you given the Indians shelter in your post, we've would have attacked you."

Campbell - "If you had attacked our post, I had the authority to take action against you.  By the way, I really resent you riding around my post with some of your men   shouting insults at my men and insulting our flag.  If you keep this up and do it again, I'll have no choice but to take action, that both our countries would want to avoid."  

  Wayne - "Not only did you build your fort on United States property, but you also built it in the center of villages of the very people we're at war with.  That said, in the  name of the United States, I demand you to avoid any aggressive actions against my army and abandon the post and go to the nearest British post.   You will not be harmed."  

 Campbell -  "I will not abandon this post under threats by you or anyone unless I'm ordered to do so.   I want to remind you if anyone from your army should approach my fort, they should expect consequences."    

The Absolute Genius of Anthony Wayne

With an army of approx. 2000, General Wayne could easily have "dislodged" Major Campbells force of approx. 200 from the fort but he chose not to for these reasons.  

1)  If Wayne had attacked the post and Campbell retaliated it could have led to war with the United States, something England could not afford.  England was already at war with France and fighting two wars on  two continents was something it simply could not afford.   

3)  If Wayne attacked the fort, and Campbell retaliated, Wayne's force would have prevailed and would have forced Major Campbell and his men to surrender the fort.  

Important:  The Indians watching events unfold from nearby woods would have seen their brave British allies fighting the Americans to the bitter end, heroes in their eyes.   Instead, they had been locked out of the fort and watched as General Wayne and his men paraded around the British fort hurling insults, taunting them and mocking their flag while the British doing nothing. To the Indian this was cowardice on the British part, something they absolutely detested. It also sent a clear signal that the British could no longer be counted on for support.    

Scorched Earth  

Wayne's attempt to provoke Major Campbell into a response had fallen short so on August 23 he broke camp and headed west toward his original objective, Kekionga.  Before leaving he set fire to everything with view of the fort "even under the muzzles of his (Campbell's) guns."  The marched west using the military strategy of scorched Earth,  "destroying everything that allows an enemy force to be able to fight including deprivation and destruction of water, food, humans, animals, plants and any kind of tools and infrastructures."   

Waynes troops destroyed all the cornfields, orchards, cabins and shelters for miles  on both sides of the Maumee River, including Indian agent Alexander McKee's trading post.  

The Long Cold Winter 

 With their food sources destroyed and their cabins and shelters burned to the ground, the Indians knew they faced a long cold winter.  No doubt, there was much discussion among the various tribes that winter as to what their next course of action should be.  While the younger warriors wanted to continue their fight against the Americans, older warriors, most who had been fighting the Americans for many years knew it was time  to stop.  On August 3, 1795, almost a year after the battle at Fallen Timber, General Wayne and various tribal leaders met at Fort Greenville and signed the Greenville Treaty.

  

A Personal Note

  In 1996 I volunteered to use my metal detecting services to help with the archaeology work being done at the Fallen Timbers battlefield.  I drove from Lima everyday for a week.  We were given a tube of flags with instructions to place them where we got a strong signal.  We were also instructed not to dig anything up.  On my last day there I got a very strong signal and I thought, "Heck, I've been doing this for years and I'm going to see what this thing is."  I stuck my bayonet down into the ground and up popped a 69 caliber Charleville musket ball.  I stood there in amazement thinking this was fired during the Battle of Fallen Timbers.  To me this was like finding an arrow head at Custers Little Big Horn battle field.  When I got home I told my buddy Darrel Young what I had found and he said, "let me see it,"  I hesitated and he said, "You put it back in ground didn't you."  I said, "Yeah."  We both knew why.  

Finding the musketball was, and still is, one of the most exciting finds of my life and taking it home would have been so easy, but to this day I still remember the feeling I had pushing it back down into the dirt.  In that instant I remeinded myself that that simple musketball was part of a major event in American HIstory and taking it, in my minds eye, would have been akin to minimizing or soiling the history of all that took place that day in August 1794.  I think I was smiling as I did it because in my own way I had helped preserve a piece of history.   

BTW,  I have a button from one of Anthony Waynes soldiers I found near Fort Amanda.  Even thought it's only one of dozens found in northwest Ohio, would I take $10,000 for it.  What do you think? 

 

"In your face General Harrison!" 

Tenskwatawa (the "Prophet)

1775 - 1836

How in the World could he predict a solar eclipse?

The question has always been, did Tecumseh and his brother, Tenskwatwa, aka known as the "Prophet" make their bold prediction of an upcoming solar eclipse based on hearsay or from something they may have read somewhere?.  I think I have the answer to that question and will present it at the end of the following article.

The following is an excerpt from of an article written by Pam Frazier Cottrel and published in the Springfield News Sun.  You can find the article in its entirety at  https://www.springfieldnewssun.com/news/

The total solar eclipse of 1806:  How a prediction from "The Prophet" shaped U.S. - Native American relations. 

 

By Pam Cottrel – Contributing Writer

Before the April 8 solar eclipse happens, let’s take a look at the last time this area experienced a total solar eclipse 218 years ago.  Some historians say that the 1806 Eclipse contributed to the start of the War of 1812. And an interesting story that is.The total eclipse on June 13, 1806 is also known as the Tecumseh Eclipse.

 The year 1806 was a turbulent time in Ohio and the Northwest Territory immediately to its west and north. Although Ohio had become a state in 1803, the northwest corner of the state belonged to the Shawnee and other tribes. The Greenville Treaty had allowed for them to live there peacefully. A cautious peace existed.

But things were different next door in the Indiana Territory. General William Henry Harrison in Vincennes was having problems with a group of Native Americans led by Tecumseh and his brother  Tenskwatwa (The Prophet)  

 Tecumseh had refused to sign the Greenville Treaty in 1795 and wanted to fight to push all settlers back east. He was urging other tribes to join him in a mighty coalition. The Prophet had hundreds of devotees who followed his every word, and the crowd was growing.

 In spring of 1806, Harrison was so fed up with Tenskwatwa’s theatrics that were disrupting the peace that he sent a letter to the two Shawnee brothers.  In his letter, Harrison wrote: “If he (the Prophet) is really a prophet, ask him to cause the Sun to stand still or the Moon to alter its course, the rivers to cease to flow or the dead to rise from their graves.”

 According to accounts in “The Frontiersman” and “Sorrow in the Heart” by Allan W Eckert, this is how it happened:

When the letter was received by the brothers, they met alone then later emerged with an answer.  The Prophet told his followers that in exactly 50 days he would make the moon cover the sun and it would be as dark as night. The word spread quickly to all the tribes in the region. The Prophet had promised to prove his power.

 Just before noon on June 13, 1806, the Great Eclipse of 1806 began. No one on the frontier had ever seen anything like that before. Standing in front of his cabin, The Prophet had made the moon block the sun. The entire dramatic event was awe-inspiring to his followers. Those who once doubted The Prophet now knew for sure that he spoke with authority and his predictions were real.  Tenskwatwa and Tecumseh gained greatly in power.

 And the situation between Harrison and the two Shawnee leaders dramatically worsened. Eventually this growing animosity led to the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, which led to the War of 1812.

 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 So How Did the Prophet Predict the Eclipse?

The gauntlet had been thrown down.  General Harrison, tired of Tecumseh and his brother running around the frontier disrupting his attempts for peace taslks, challenged the brothers to prove their powers by  "cause the Sun to stand still or the Moon to alter its course."   In other words Harrison was telling them either put up or shut up.  When the brothers read Harrison's challenging letter they must have laughed and laughed and laughed because they knew they could, they had ace in the hole

What was that "Ace in the Hole?"

While searching the internet for a clue, I found an excerpt from a Masters Degree thesis written by Robert Bashore Jr. in which he wrote about  medical procedures.  Three things caught my eye, the date (1806) and the phrase "figures of lunar eclipses," and "German Almanac."

"The Cincinnati Almanac No. I is unique in this particular point. It illustrates the recipe with two woodcuts, one of the true skullcap and another of a spurious herb.545 This is the only instance in all the almanacs from 1806 to 1821 where such use is made of illustration; indeed, other than title pages, the homo signorum and one or two figures of lunar eclipses (and the German almanac) this is the only instance of woodcuts appearing within the body of such works."

The key word, "almanac" made me wonder if there was an American version in 1806, Not only was there an American version (Farmer's Almanck), it was widely distributed.  I located a copy of 1806 Almanack on the intenet and luckily  the bottom half of the cover page is missing (see picture below).  Notice the next page shows a drawing and words describing an upcoming ecliplses.   Bingo!

The Ace in the Hole

 

I think it safe to say the Prophet would never have made his prediction of an eclipse based solely on word of mouth and hearsay becasue he would have had no idea of whether or not the rumors were true and if so, where  could it be proven.  After all, his reputation was ast stake. On the other hand, he could however boast of his powers to "cause the Sun to stand still or the Moon to alter its course." How?   He had scientific proof (Farmer's Almanack) that there would be an eclipse in June 1806.

In the end, one must wonder what General Harrison thought when he realized his challenge to Tecumseh and his brother had backfired.  The Prophet had called his bluff.  I wonder if while watching the eclipse, the Gerneral  slapped his forehead and said "DUH!"   With all due respect General Harrison, using tmodern vernacular, "You just got faced ."

 

Pogue's Servant Runs Away

The First Black Man in Auglaize County

Runaway 

If you recall from my last blog, Col. Robert Pogue brought a black servant named David with him when he came to Fort Amanda in 1812.  To my knowleddge, David s the first African-American to take up residence in what later became Auglsize Cty. Ohio. 

Officers at the time were authorized to have a personal servant so Pogue selected David, a family slave to accompany him. Whether David volunteered or “was volunteered,” we will never know. What we do know is that Pogue did have an "expense account" and was reimbursed for David’s services (22 cents a day). Not a bad wage considering the average soldiers pay was about 33 cents a day.

****************************************************  

Robert Pogue Lt. Col. Comm.

4th Regiment Ky. Vol. Militia

For: The pay of David, a private servant not of the line or militia from the 27th day of August, 1812 to the 18th March 1813, being 6 months and twenty three days at $6.66 per month. ($44.90).
I certify on honor that the above account is accurate and just, and that I employed and kept in service, a servant not of the line of the army or militia for the term above charged, and that I didn’t during the time herein charge, keep or employ as a waiter or servant any soldier from the line of the army or militia
Robert Pogue, Comm. 4th Rgt. Ky M. Vol.

Flemingsburg Kentucky, August 24, 1813. Received of Lt. George Botts pay muster to the 4th regiment Ky. Vol. Militia forty four dollars ninety cents in full payment of the above account for the services of my private servant Davey. Having signed triplicates.
Robert Pogue. 

 

After the War

David Runs Away

Pogue a wealthy tobacco farmer owned 11 slaves at the time. Ten years later on Tuesday, January 22, 1822, David walked away from the Pogue farm without permission and without telling anyone. He traveled 12 miles south as far as Flemingsburg, Ky. when, for whatever reason, he decided he wanted to return to home. 

Davids Journey from Mayslick to Flemingsburg, Ky. A Distance of 12 Miles

12 miles from the Pogue farm to Flemingsburg.

Presbyterian Church - Flemingsburg, Ky.  Built 1819

When David arrived in Flemingsburg, he went straight to the home of a man named James K. Bunch, who happened to be a friend of Col Pogue. Fearing some sort of reprisal from Pogue, David asked Bunch to intercede on his behalf which. Bunch did in the form of a letter (below).

  Flemingsburg, January 22, 1822
My dear friend

Your black man, David just visited at my house, and solicited me to give him a pass to return home. He says he left home this morning without your permission or knowledge. He declares to me that it is his desire and intention to return home this evening. He fears chastisement for his conduct. He appears penitent. He promises future obedience and submission. He begs me to intercede for him.
My dear friend will you forgive him. Make trial I doubt not but he deserves chastisement, but perhaps his promises are sincere. Perhaps he will keep them. Alas! How often has we disobeyed, offended and run away from our Master in Heaven. And how often has he kindly forgiven us.
May the Lord God of …… bless you and your dear companion and children and servants.
Yours most sincerely and affectionately
James K. Bunch
My dear brother in Christ If I have done wrong you will forgive
Flemingsburg, January 22, 1822
My dear friend

 

Until I found this letter, the only thing I knew about David was his name. Now after reading and re-reading it several times, I've made a few observations readers might find interesting. 

First of all, my guess is that David was between 15 - 20 when he came to Ft. Amanda as Col. Pogue's servant in 1813. I say that because Pogue needed someone old enough and strong enough to perform physical labor and withstand the rigors of camp life compared to an older man who might not be able to. This would then mean that when the events in the letter took place, David may have been between 20 and 25. If he was married, that could help explain his change of heart and wanting to return home. 

At this point, my obsession for details kicked in and I had to now khow the escape took place, including the time, weather.  Things I considered:

1: The moon phase the night of Jan. 22, 1822 was a waning crescent meaning there was very little light from the moon that night. It was perfect for someone trying to travel unnoticed.

2: There was only about 11 hours of daylight on this date. (7 AM to 6 PM)

3: It was the middle of Winter, cold with possible snow and ice on the ground.

4. It was 12 miles from the Pogue farm near Mayslick to Flemingsburg, Ky.

5: David wanted to return that same day and if he wanted to be home by 6, he'd have to leave Flemingsburg by 2 that afternoon.

Taking all this into consideration, I created the following scenario of what Davids escape may have looked like showing that David left the Pogue farm shortly after midnight on the morning of Tuesday, Jan. 22, 1822.

I believe David left the Pogue farm shortly after midnight on Tuesday morning. He knew there was only a 7 hour window of darkness between midnight and daybreak at 7 o'clock AM. David knew he had to travel after dark to avoid capture either by Pogues men or even worse by slave hunters. There was very little moonlight that night so he had to travel slowly to avoid stepping in holes, ditches, etc., plus there may have been snow and ice covering the road. He also had to walk slowly to avoid working up a sweat, getting wet and risk pneumonia or even worse, freezing to death. 

Somewhere along the way David, for whatever reason decided he wanted to return home. He knew that at daybreak, Pogue would be alerted to his being missing so he had to get to Flemingsburg before daylight. Allowing 5 hours for slow travel and rest stops, my guess is he arrived at the Bunch home around 5:00 that morning meaning Bunch was probably still in bed. He knew that James Bunch, who lived there was a friend of Pogue otherwise he wouldn't have gone there. Bunch would have known David as well otherwise he may not have let him into his home, especially at that hour of the night. Once inside, the two men talked for about an hour during which David made clear that he wanted to come home and he wouldn't try to escape again. Bunch then penned the letter to Pogue. 

]

David had requested that he be allowed to return home that day and they both knew that if that if he was to be home by dark David would have to leave Flemingsburg no later than 2 o'clock that afternoon. By this time it would be approaching 7 o'clock in the morning. Bunch would have made arrangements for a rider on horseback to deliver the letter to Pogue. Leaving Flemingsburg around 6:30 AM, the rider would have gotten to Pogues farm around 9 o'clock. Assuming Pogue got the message right away, he would have written Bunch a brief note, given it to the rider and sent him back to Flemingsburg around 9:30 AM. Arriving back in Flemingsburg around noon, Bunch would have shared Pogue's response. Assuming it was favorable, David probably left the Bunch home shortly after noon and arrived back in Mayslick between 4 and 5 o'clock that afternoon. If Jane Pogue's Last Will and Testament is any indication of the Pogue family's relationship with their servants, I feel certain that while David may have received some sort of reprimand, it wasn't too harsh.

Note: I found it interesting the term "slave" was never used in Pogues correspondance.  Rev. Bunch refers to David as a "black man,"  and Pogue referred to David as his "servant." Neither used the term "slave." In addition, the second line in Pogues wife Last Will and Testmetnt she declared that money be put aside to secure the freedom of "Charles Canterbury." Again, there was mention of the word, slave or servant. Was it because David and the others had lived with the Pogues for so many years, they were considered more as servants rather than slaves per se. In addition, when I located the old 

Last Will and Testament of Jane Pogue (Wife of Fort Amanda's Builder) Regarding  Freeing Charles Canterbury

1846

 

 I Jane Pogue of Mason County Kentucky, being of sound and disposing mind and memory do make and publish this my last will and testament.

First I desire my burial conducted and completed in the manner I have repeatedly desired and not necessary to be repeated and my burial and funeral expenses (including a plain monument for myself and late husband each) to be paid.

First I desire my burial conducted and completed in the manner I have repeatedly desired and not necessary to be repeated and my burial and funeral expenses (including a plain monument for myself and late husband each) to be paid. 

Second - I set apart out of the first money arising from my estate a fund sufficient to purchase the freedom of Charles Canterberry and direct that he be purchased and set free so soon after the collection of said fund as the same can be realized after sale on the usual terms and credits.

Third - I desire the real estate I now own to be rented out for four years after my decease and then to be sold to the highest bidders (desiring that some one of my grandchildren will prepare him or herself to purchase) on a credit of instal(l)ments equal to one year and this with all other moneys arising from my estate after specific legacies to be equally divided among my seventeen grandchildren, Eli, Elizabeth, Robert, Franklin, Amanda, and Maria, children of E. P. Pogue, Henry, Amanda Jane, Robert, William and Harriet, children of W. L. Pogue, Andrew W., son of Jane I Mackey. Eliza Jane daughter of John W. Pogue, Robert, Samuel, John and Gideon children of Ann E. Garrison. Should any money be left from my personal estate after the purchase of Charles it is to be lent out at interest until the money arising from my land is collected.

 I have given to each of my granddaughters, Elizabeth Jane and Amanda Jane a feather bed and bedding, a carpet the former, the carpet now in the lower South room which beds and carpets are to be excluded from the computation in making the distribution as above provided, and they are now to be considered as forming no part of my estate.

 

I hereby nominate and appoint William L. Pogue the Executor of this my last will and testement desiring that he should not be required to give security for the performance of his duties as such.

In witness whereof I have hereto set my hand and seal this 15th day of October 1846.

Jane Pogue (seal)

 

Signed sealed and published by the testatrix in presence of us and w have signed and witness and seal the same in presence of the testatrix.

John H. Shanklin

James H. Shanklin

 Mason County 1st December Court 1846

The last will and testament of Jane Pogue deceased , was produced in court and proved by the oaths of John H. Shanklin and James H. Shanklin the publishing witnesses hereto and hesame is ordered to be recorded.

Sworn to by William L. Pogue the Executor therein named who executed bond in the penalty of four thousand dollars conditioned as the law requires. And upon his motion it is ordered that probate be granted him in due form.

Attach John James Key MC

Copy attach Robt. A. Cochran MCM CO. Ct.

 I located the Pogue family graveyard in an overgrown woods in Kentucky in 2000. In addition to Amanda's grave we learned that some of the family "servants" were also buried in the same family grave yard.  The assumption is David lived out his life with the Pogues and nothing has been found as to the whereabouts of Charles Cantebury after he was freed. 

A Spanish Coin & Wayne's Forgotten Storehouse

A Spanish Coin & Wayne's Forgotten Storehouse

      

HEAD OF NAVIGATION

 In my three previous blogs, I presented three possible scenarios of how a 1780 Spanish Reale coin could have ended up at Fort Amanda.   After careful consideration and comments from readers, I concluded that none of the three seemed likely.  

There is however, a 4th possibility and one that very likely could explain not only how the coin ended up in a field near Fort Amanda, it could also support my  proposal that Gen. Anthony Wayne built a post in 1795 near the same site and named it Head of Auglaize.  This raises the question; "did one of Wayne's soldiers drop the coin during construction of the new post"?

The Most Likely Scenario

The following is a copy of a paper I submitted a paper to Bowling Green University - Maumee Valley Historical Society, in which I presented my proposal that General Anthony Wayne did built a post on the west bank of the Auglaize River at the site that would later become Fort Amanda.  The following is a copy of my paper explaining my rational for making that proposal.  I have added maps and drawings for orientation. 

Wayne’s Forgotten Storehouse on the Auglaize River

David R. Johnson, MA

Fort Amanda Memorial Park in Auglaize County, Ohio marks the site of Fort Amanda, a fortified War of 1812 supply depot constructed in November 1812 by troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Pogue. This would serve as a departure point for navigable river transport of men and materiel into the greater Maumee River watershed in support of General Harrison’s planned military actions against the British and their occupation of Detroit This article proposes that Fort Amanda was not the first fortified structure built at that location; rather, in 1795 General Anthony Wayne had also recognized the location’s strategic importance and constructed a post there. This theory is supported by letters of correspondence between Wayne and Secretaries of War Knox and Pickering.  Finally, 1796 correspondence exists between Pickering and the Committee on Military Enlistments recommending that a small garrison be installed at Wayne’s new post. Although events surrounding Wayne’s 1792-1796 campaign in western Ohio are well documented, this article analyzes just those events between 1793 and 1796 considered germane to the discussion. It is presented in a chronological format.

Between 1780 and 1790, Indians, with the aid of their British allies, had murdered over 1,500 settlers in Kentucky and along the north side of the Ohio River.  Untold numbers of Native peoples died in the same period, one of back-and-forth intermittent violence in this contested region. Public outcry demanded the government take action. In 1790 General Josiah Harmar was chosen to lead a campaign to destroy the Miami villages at KeKionga.^[1] The mission was a dismal failure. The following year General Arthur St. Clair led a campaign to complete Harmar’s mission and his was a catastrophic failure.^[2] In 1792 General Anthony Wayne was appointed Commander of the United States Army of the Northwest. His mission was the same as his predecessors, destroy the Miami villages. Unlike his predecessors, Wayne was not about to enter enemy territory with ill-trained troops, so he spent the winter of 1792-93 training his army on frontier warfare tactics at a camp in Western Pennsylvania called Legion Ville. The army left Pennsylvania mid-April 1793 and by October, it had advanced to within 80 miles of the Miami villages. Here the army halted on a tributary of Stillwater Creek^[3] and began construction of Fort Greenville.^[4] General Wayne’s plan for keeping his troops supplied during the campaign to Kekionga called for the use of contractors, a very expensive and notoriously unreliable service. In the spring of 1794, he began looking at the feasibility of using rivers to transport his supplies versus overland carriage using contractors. To his north were the St. Marys and Auglaize rivers and to the east, the Great Miami.

In early January, Wayne sent a small detachment of soldiers to reconnoiter a route from Ft. Greenville to the Auglaize River. The group stumbled into a large Indian encampment, skirmish ensued and three of his soldiers were killed. The remainder of the group returned to Fort Greenville. Wayne’s wrote the following to Secretary of War, Henry Knox Wayne regarding the incident:

January 8, 1794 - On the 2d Instant[5] Mr. Collings, A D Q Master with a serjeant corporal & twelve privates of Capt. Eaton's, company who were sent to reconnoiter a position between this place & Au Glaize preparatory to further operations, came in sudden contact with a considerable Indian encampment, which they deemed less dangerous to attack, then to attempt a retreat, after being discover’d. The result was three privates killed on the spot, on our part and five warriors upon theirs. When this gallant little party arrived in Camp in the course of the next day, one of them slightly wounded in the shoulder  & the clothing of most of the others perforated by rifle balls. I have since order’d out another detachment Under Capt. Eaton to complete the business upon which Mr. Collings was first sent & expect his return in the course of two or three days with some interesting information.[6]

 

Wayne subsequently abandoned the idea of a straight-line route from Greenville to the Auglaize fearing it would leave the flanks of his army and supply trains exposed to the enemy for nearly 50 miles.

 Knowing the Great Miami River was navigable as far north as Loramie’s store Wayne sent out a second detachment to look for a route from that place to the Auglaize. What they found was the distance between those two points, Loramies and the Auglaize, was about 20 miles. Wayne knew if he could ship supplies up the Great Miami to Loramie’s store, off load them, put them on wagons and haul them 20 miles to the Auglaize, the savings in terms of safety, time and cost would be enormous.

 January 18, 1794 - I have in contemplation to appoint the first of May for opening the treaty so as to be in perfect readiness at an early period to operate with effect should it prove abortive as well as to take advantage of the high waters to aid our transport up the Great Miami as far as it may be found to be navigable say to Chillakothe or rather to Loramies store at the carrying place between the Great Miami and the Au Glaize which is computed to be 18 or 20 miles. 

Up to this point, Indian forces had been playing a guessing game with Wayne about when or even if, they would come to the negotiating table and sign a peace treaty. Frustrated, Wayne decided to move forward and build a post on Auglaize. This would send a clear message to the Indians that his army was just a few miles away from their “Grand Emporium” the Glaize:

March 3, 1794 - I am determined to establish a strong post on the banks of Au Glaize, at the north end of the portage, …. The distance from then to Grand Glaize,[7] - at its confluence with the Miami of the Lake,[8] is not more than from twenty five to thirty. Miles[9] – they will therefore be compelled to treat-fight or to abandon their towns hunting grounds & possessions.  The benefit of water transport during the spring season, from a conviction that it is next to an impossibility to supply a large body of troops so far advanced in an uncultivated & savage wilderness for any length of time by means of pack Horses or land carriage only.         

March 10, 1794 - Mc Mahan found a Great part of the Ground inundated & the creeks Unfordable from a heavy fall of rain that continued for some days- & and which prevented him from reconnoitering the portage with effect. 

March 20, 1794 - I shall therefore make every preparation for taking ground in front, by establishing a post on the Au Glaize at the North end of the portage as mentioned in my letter of the 3rd Instant as soon as the waters & circumstances will permit.[10]

Where was the “North End of the Portage?”

The May 7 letter is very important in that it pinpoints the location of the “north end of the portage,” the point Wayne intended to build his post. It was 21 miles from Loramie's store and 35-36 miles from Pique Town.

 May 7, 1794 - I must acknowledge that I have a strong prejudice in favor of a post at the North end of the portage on Au Glaize river & in favor of that route in preference to this; because at a proper season, i.e., in the spring & fall of the year, all supplies for the use of the troops & Garrisons may be transported by Water, with only twenty-one miles Land carriage, which is between the head of the navigation of the Miami of the Ohio, say at Loramies stores (about fifteen miles above the Old Chillakothe or Pique town) (Fig. 1) & even from the Chillakothe to that point on Au Glaize wou’d be but about 35 or 36 miles over a fine level open ground (Fig. 2).  At all events the savages out to be removed from, or kept in check at Grand Glaize; by establishing a post at the place before mentioned- & to which a road is already Opened, it is so from situate as to be within striking distance both of Grand Glaize & Roche de Bout at the foot of the Rapids of the Miami of the Lake the distance to either of those places from that point don’t exceed Forty miles - & forms an Equilateral triangle between those three points.[11] 

Notice in his May 7 letter Wayne again writes that he intends to build a post on the Auglaize and identifies it as being 21 miles from Loramies store and 36 miles from Piqua.  The two lines merge near Fort Amanda.  The key statement is Wayne's comment, "a road is already opened."  

 

  

    Figure 1                                   Figure 2 - Equilateral Triangle

River Transport Plan Temporarily Put on Hold

By May 1794, the Indians had abandoned the Miami villages and moved east, gathering in force near Grand Glaize and Roche de Boueuf.^[12] With Kekionga no longer his primary target, Wayne shifted his attentions to his new target; Grand Glaize. The situation along the Maumee had created a sense of emergency forcing Wayne to put into motion his plans for advancing north. His plans for a post on the Auglaize were put on hold as the logistical issues involved had not yet been fully developed.

Wayne’s army left Greenville in late July, took command of Grand Glaize, marched east and defeated the Indians and their allies at Fallen Timbers. The army marched west to the abandoned Miami villages where Wayne built Fort Wayne.                             

Post-Fallen Timbers

During his campaign, Wayne had constructed two new forts; Fort Defiance and Fort Wayne, now those posts needed be supplied. In October, Wayne began to focus once again on the river routes:

October 17, 1794 - The Posts in contemplation at Chillakothe or Picque town, on the Miami of the Ohio, at Loramies stores on the North branch & at the Old Tawa towns on the Au Glaize, are with a view to facilitate the transport of supplies by water, and which to a certainty will reduce the land carriage of dead or leady articles at proper seasons i.e., late in the fall and early in the spring to thirty-five miles and in times of freshes to twenty- in place of One Hundred & seventy five by the most direct road to Grand Glaize & one Hundred & fifty to the Miami villages from Fort Washington.[13]                                                           

November 12, 1794 - As soon as circumstances will admit, the posts contemplated at Pique town, Loramies Store, & at the old Tawa Towns at the head of the Navigation on the Au Glaize River, will be established for the reception of & as deposits for the stores and supplies by water carriage which is not determined to be perfectly practical in proper seasons.[14]

1795: Treaty Signing

The following year on August 3, 1795, the Treaty of Greenville was signed. In Article 3, Section 3 of the treaty, there is a specification that one piece six miles square at the head of the navigable waters of the Au Glaize River was to be ceded to the United States. This area encompassed the north end of the portage between Loramie’s Store and the Auglaize River including the Old Tawa Town near where Wayne intended to build his post:

  

 September 2, 1795 - I expect in the course of a few days to advance with the light infantry and Artificers in order to establish, a post & store houses at the Landing on the St. Mary’s and on the Au Glaize. I have already established one at Loramies.

September 19, 1795 - I intend as soon as the Equinoctial[15] storm is over to advance with the light infantry & artificers to the landing on St. Mary's, in order to erect a post & storehouse at that place. I shall also reconnoiter a position on the Au Glaize to determine whether a post will be established at that place or not, if I find that it will be of real advantage, I shall also establish one on that river within the reservation.[16]

 

Severe storms beginning mid-September and lasting through the end of the month kept Wayne from reconnoitering the north end of the portage. By October 5, storms and heavy rains had subsided and Wayne headed north to reconnoiter a route between Loramie’s store and the St. Marys River.  He planned to build a post or storehouses on the St. Marys then travel over to the Auglaize to determine if a post there would be valuable: 

 

 October 5, 1795 - I shall mount my horse in the course of a few Minutes in order to overtake the troops now in full March to establish the post or posts mentioned in my letter of the 19th Ultimo.[17]

November 9, 1795 - I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your several letters of the 26th of September, the 3rd, 10th and 17th of October. The last three came to hand whilst I was on the tour & duty mentioned in my letters of the 19th of September and 5th Ultimo , and from which I returned a few days since, after completing a chain of posts & storehouses at St. Mary's - Loramies & the old Chillakothe near the confluence of the North & East branches of the Miami of the Ohio.[18]

Wayne left Greenville on October 5 and returned the first week of November. In his November 9 letter to Pickering, Wayne wrote that he completed a chain of posts at St. Marys, Loramies and Piqua, In at least eleven of his previous letters, Wayne had expressed intense interest in building a post on the Auglaize yet he makes no mention of doing so in this letter. The reason, is simple: he had not built it…yet!.   

On November 18, Wayne wrote Pickering advising against transmitting dispatches by water, particularly the Ohio River that late in the season because of ice blockages on the rivers. He indicated the following:

The season being so far advanced I do not think it safe to commit the dispatches as herewith transmitted – by Water to Pittsburgh - as is more than probably the boat wou’d be impeded if not totally stopped by the ice.[19] 

1796: Post-Treaty Events

On February 3, 1796, Secretary of War Pickering, submitted a report to the Committee on Military Establishments listing the frontier posts he and General Wayne recommended retain a military presence of various kinds. A section of that report read:

 

In applying the military force to these objects, I have thrown the posts to be occupied into divisions, in each of which there will be a principal station for the ordinary residence of the Commandant of the division. One battalion will occupy one of these divisions, and a sub-legion three of them. The Lieutenant Colonel will take a station the most convenient for superintending his sub-legion. A general officer will find abundant employment in visiting and regulating all the posts. Beyond question, the military posts we must occupy, on our frontiers, will be numerous, though the garrison will be small.

 

INTERESTING NOTE:

On Nov. 9, 1795 Wayne wrote that he had "completed a chain of posts & storehouses  at St. Marys - Loramies & old Chilakothe.  In Pickering's lists of posts to be occupied, the Greenville district lists, Jefferson, Greenville, Recovery and Adams as a  "fort" whereas Loramies and Head of Navigation are not.  Wayne never refers to Loramie's as a fort nor does he about Head of Auglaize inferring that both places were storehouses and not forts.  

Posts to Be Occupied and Troop Distribution[20]

Head of Auglaize

Pickering’s list of military stations to be occupied does not include Fort St. Marys. On the other hand, it does include one called “Head of Auglaize. The reason St. Marys is not mentioned is because Wayne closed it the latter part of 1795. A question that emerges is “why did he close the post on the St. Marys River and build one on the Auglaize?"

 Perhaps the best answer can be found in excerpts from letters written in 1795 and 1812 describing the condition of both rivers in winter. On November 18, 1795 in a letter to Pickering, Wayne wrote:

    

The season being so far advanced I do not think it safe to commit the dispatches as herewith transmitted – by Water to Pittsburgh - as is more than probably the boat wou’d be impeded if not totally stopped by the ice.[21]

 

Seventeen years later, Major Thomas Bodley sent a message to General William Henry Harrison describing in great detail the poor conditions of the St. Marys River and the difficulties it presented while trying to getting supplies to Fort Wayne. The following are excerpts from the December 11, 1812 message to Harrison:

 

A messenger arrived with information that the last boats were stopped by the ice below this about 40 miles by water and about 12 by land that they had used every exertion but could proceed no further and in the Evening our express arrived from the first boats that they got to Shane’s Crossing about 60 miles by water and 18 by land from this place where they were frozen up and no possibility of them getting on. There was no alternative left but to secure the craft and properly which Col. Barbee taken every necessary step to effect Captain Jordan’s company remain with the first boats and to build storehouses etc.

The roads are so extremely bad and the waters have been so high as to render it impossible for wagons or horses to travel.

The St. Marys is so extremely crooked and blocked up with drift wood in many places where its out of the Bank and overflowed for miles in short terns. The slush has collected and frozen solid so as to dam it up for miles. Consequently, nothing but a general thaw or hard rains can give us the benefit of the navigation of this stream. The Auglaize is much straighter, has more water and will not freeze up as soon as the St. Marys.[22]

 

Nineteen Years Later - 1813

More Proof of Wayne's Presence on the Auglaize

.Book and Journal of Robt. B. McAfee's Mounted Company, in Col. Richard M. Johnson's Regiment, from May 19th, 1813, including Orders, & cc

 August 30, 1813 --Started early got to St. Marys to Breakfast campt on the bank of the river opposite the fort, & drew some forage provision, & camp equipage and then by the direction of the Col. moved on to Fort Amanda on the Auglaise twelve miles, where we arrived late in the evening & crossed the river at the fort and campt in an open field on a hill half a mile from the fort called the Ottowa village destroyed by Genl. Wayne in the year 1794, & in the night our horses were alarmed & we lost several that ran off this day it rained upon us our business at present will be to guard Military stores on to Ft. Meigs where we will join the main N. W. Army.

Concluding Remarks

In his November 9,^, 1795 letter to Secretary of War Pickering, Wayne wrote that during the month of October, he had completed a chain of posts at St. Marys, Loramie’s store and Piqua, and yet despite his intense interest in building a post on the Auglaize, he made no mention of building one there. The reason: he decided to use the St. Marys River to transport supplies to Fort Wayne and Fort Defiance. All went well during the summer months of 1795 however, winter conditions that year basically closed the St. Marys. Conditions of the rivers were so poor, Wayne even suggested messages between himself and Pickering be carried by hand overland to avoid being frozen in one of the main rivers.

As Major Bodley pointed out in his letter to General Harrison, the Auglaize was much straighter, was deeper and was not as quick to freeze up as the St. Marys. Simply put, Wayne had no choice. The proposal is sometime between the end of November 1795 and January 1796 Wayne built Head of Auglaize at the north end of the portage between Laramie’s store and the Auglaize River, not out of preference, but out of necessity.

Seventeen years later, General William Henry Harrison, Commander of the Army of the Northwest, who as a young man served an aide-de-camp to General Wayne during his Fallen Timbers campaign, returned to the “north end of the portage” and built Fort Amanda in the same area Wayne had chosen for Head of Auglaize. Was this merely a coincidence, or did this reflect Harrison’s prior familiarity with Wayne’s campaign? 

Final Thought

The above is my proposal that General Anthony Wayne built a storehouse in 1795 on the west bank of the Auglaize River that served as a supply depot for materials being shipped north to supply troops at Fort Defiance.  He named it Head of Auglaize.  The site was of such strategic importance that seventeen years later, during the War of 1812, General Harrisons built a fort at or near the same site, Fort Amanda and used for the same purpose.  As for the Spanish Reale coin discovered at Fort Amanda and the fact that more than 40 have been discovered at another of Wayne's sites (Loramie store), one must wonder if the coin could have been dropped by one of General Wayne's soldiers during construction of Head of Auglaize.  Hopefully the work done later this year by Greg Shipley and his team at Fort Amanda will shed some light on whether  all this.  If what I've proposed in this blog proves true, it will change the whole narrative of the history of the area and open many more opportunities for future study.

References

American State Papers, House of Representatives, 4th Congress, 1st Session. Military Affairs: Volume 1, Pg 2. 113-114.

Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Ky. Bodley Family. Papers, 1773-1939. Call No.: Mss. A B668e 154.

Knopf, Richard C. “Anthony Wayne – A Name in Arms,” Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 59-1524, 1959, ISBN: 13:978-0-8229-8359-0.

[1] Kekionga was a major Miami village at the branch of the St. Joseph and Maumee Rivers in present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana.


[2] The battle is referred to today as “St. Clair’s Defeat.”

[3] Greenville River.

[4] Present-day Greenville, Ohio.

[5] “Instant”: in this usage, the term refers to a recent occurrence in the present or current month.

[6] Knopf, 288

[7] Present-day Defiance, Ohio.
    
[8] Early name used by white settlers for the Maumee River.

[9] Wayne estimated the distance from the north end of the portage to Grand Glaize to be 25 to 30 miles. The actual “as the crow flies” distance is 41 miles.

[10] Knopf, 312 .

[11] Knopf, 325

[12] Present-day Waterville, Ohio.

[13] Present-day Cincinnati, Ohio.

[14] Knopf, 363 .

[15] Equinoctial storms are violent winds or rains occurring at or near the time of an equinox.

[16] Knopf, 459

[17] In this usage “Ultimo” means an event that took place the previous month.

[18] Knopf, 468

[19] Knopf, 472

[20] American State Papers, House of Representatives, 4th Congress, 1st Session. Military Affairs: Volume 1,  Pg 2. 113-114.

[21] Knopf, 472

[22] Bodley Family. Papers, 1773-1939