Gen.
Anthony Wayne
(1745
– 1796)
By the spring of
1792 President Washington and Secretary of War Knox had re-structured the United
States Army into what they called a “legion,” modeled in part from the ancient
Roman legions. What they needed now was a battle hardened General to lead it. Their choice; Anthony Wayne. Wayne had earned
the nickname “Mad Anthony” from a bold night time bayonet only attack on a
British position during the Revolutionary War. Despite being outnumbered, his
efforts proved successful and the victory provided a much needed morale booster
to the Continental army who very much needed a victory of any kind. His fiery
temper and unquestionable courage made him the logical choice to lead a new campaign.
The 48 year old Wayne came out of retirement and accepted the commission of
Major General and Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army.
During the spring
and summer months of 1792, Wayne assembled his army of 2500 men at an
encampment near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Needing a more suitable place to winter his troops, Wayne moved the camp
twenty-two miles to the west on the banks of the Ohio River near Baden,
Pennsylvania where he named his new encampment Legionville.[1] Wayne’s
primary focus in preparing for his campaign was training and supplies. While
training his men on military maneuvers and target practice were high
priorities, his highest was finding contractors he could rely on to keep his
men supplied during the campaign. He wasn’t about to lead an army into the
wilderness without an adequate supply chain. Keeping an army supplied during
the summer months was difficult enough but during the winter months this was
compounded by harsh winter weather conditions and the fact that the grasses,
leaves and stems for animal feed were all but non-existent. This issue was so
important to Wayne that rather than having subordinate officers negotiate
contracts with contractors, he actually negotiated many of the contracts
himself and making it abundantly clear
that failure to fulfill their contractual obligations carried stiff penalties
and severe consequences.
1792-1793
During the winter
months 1792-93, Legionville evolved from being a temporary encampment to a small
city. It covered approximately 35 acres, contained over 500 buildings, a parade
ground for practicing maneuvers and a rifle range for target practice. By spring,
the population of Legionville had grown to nearly five times that of nearby
Pittsburgh.
Wayne’s game plan
called for floating his men and materials down the Ohio River on barges to
Cincinnati, disembark and advance overland to the north. In preparation,
contractors had been working for months building large flat bottom boats designed
to navigate the shallow Ohio River.[2] The larger crafts were each capable of
transporting up to 40 men.
Finally, after
months of planning and preparations Wayne’s army was ready to head
westward. Sixty boats had been built to
transport his 2500 man army and another eight designed to carry heavy artillery
pieces, powder and shot. Riders and
drivers for the supply trains, horses, cattle and forage were loaded onto
twelve additional boats that had been built specifically for that purpose. Early
on the morning of April 30, 1793, the first boats of pushed off heading
westward; the largest flotilla ever floated on the Ohio River.
The 463 mile
journey by boat from Legionville to the tiny village of Cincinnati took six
days. The boats landed near a swampy
area about a quarter mile southwest[3] of Ft.
Washington[4], the
post Harmar had built four years earlier.
Scouring the area, Wayne quickly determined that there wasn’t enough
area between Ft. Washington and the Ohio River for his encampment plus the area
around the fort was too close to the lure of the temptations of the nearby town
of Cincinnati with its “ardent poison and catiff wretches to dispose of it.”[5] Wayne decided
on an area of high ground a mile west of Ft. Washington and named his new
encampment appropriately enough; Hobson’s Choice.[6] The
men spent the rest of the spring and summer months there working on their
various drills, battle formations and target practice.
On the morning of September 17th the men took down their tents, loaded their baggage onto wagons and at the beating of the tattoo[7] formed into columns and began their march northward following the same trail Harmar and St. Clair’s armies had taken earlier. By the middle of October Wayne’s army had advanced one hundred miles north where it stopped and began construction on a fort and making plans to winter in place. When completed, the new fort covered a sprawling fifty-five acres and was the largest wooden fortification ever built in the United States. Wayne named his new fort, Ft. Greenville in honor of friend and patriot Nathaniel Green.
In December, Wayne sent a detachment of men north to the site of St. Clair’s battlefield with orders to construct a fortification on the site. Despite Captain Buntins efforts the year before, the ground was still so littered with skulls and bones that the men had to literally scrape them into piles in order to clear an area to pitch their tents. The bones were later gathered up and buried in pits. Finishing their solemn but gruesome work, the men worked throughout the rest of the winter and into spring constructing the new fort Wayne named, fittingly enough; Fort Recovery.
Fig. 1 The Great Black Swamp |
In late July,
Wayne’s army began his march north, stopping on the south bank of the St. Marys
River long enough build a small stockade which he named Ft. Adams[14] in
honor of Vice-President John Adams. An
incident took place at Ft. Adams that almost changed the course of
history. Wayne like St. Clair suffered
from severe gout, a disease that would eventually lead to his death. The pain was so severe at times that he had
to be lifted onto his horse. The hours
spent daily in the saddle had exaggerated the painful condition so on August 3rd
he retired to his tent to rest. A large Beech
tree being cut down nearby fell across Wayne’s tent and luckily it hit a stump which absorbed most of the
force, otherwise would surely have been killed. Dazed, bruised and with only a sore left leg
and ankle, Wayne spent the rest of his day in his tent no doubt thankful and
perhaps somewhat suspicious about what had just happened.
Accident or Attempted Murder?
Historians have
long debated which route Wayne took from Ft. Adams to the Grand Glaize. Some
suggest he split his forces sending a small diversionary force to the northwest
to create the perception he was planning to attack Kekionga while the main body
marched northeast and followed the Auglaize River north toward Grand
Glaize. That scenario seems unlikely as splitting
his forces would have created the risk of the diversionary force being cut off
from support from the main body. Others suggest he went northeast to the
Auglaize River and followed it directly to Grand Glaize hoping for a surprise
attack that would drive a wedge between the tribes at Kekionga and those
further to the east. While the latter
may have been his plan all along, an incident took place that same day that
probably made the decision for a direct route to the Auglaize River approach a
“no brainer.
Robert Newman, a
civilian surveyor assigned to Wayne’s army deserted the same day as the accident
that nearly killed Wayne. Newman told a
sentry he had permission from the quartermaster to leave and when the lie was
discovered, a search part was immediately sent after him. Wayne knew that under torture, Newman would
disclose details of Wayne’s army including the number of men, types of
equipment, moral of the men, etc. thus jeopardizing any chance of a surprise
attack at Grand Glaize. Wayne had no
option but to push on to Grand Glaize as quickly as possible. In the end, Wayne’s hunch was right; while the
search party didn’t find him, they did discover the spot where Newman was captured
by the Indians. He was eventually
turned over to the British in Canada who later released him. On his return to the U.S. Wayne had him arrested
for treason. Interrogated by Wayne, Newman revealed his real
purpose, and it eventually involved an accomplice; one General Wayne knew
only too well, his second-in-command, Brigadier General James Wilkinson.
Political Intrigue
Gen. James Wilkinson (1757 – 1825)
Under intense questioning, Newman revealed that Wilkinson had been involved in a scheme with contractors
who would benefit by continuing the war. One of the contractors, Robert
Elliott, had a brother in the British service, Captain Matthew Elliott, who
coincidentally was at located at Grand Glaize at that time. Did Wilkinson arrange for Newman to desert
so he could warn Elliott? That wouldn’t
have been out of character for Wilkinson who had always felt he should have
been in command of the force rather than Wayne.
Wayne was chosen
to lead the army and because of his fragile ego, Wilkinson was promoted to
brigadier general as a consolation.
Another reason Wayne was chosen over Wilkinson was because of the suspicions
that Wilkinson’s had some type of involvement with the Spanish government. That suspicion proved factual after his death
in Mexico City in 1825 when it was discovered that he had indeed been a paid
agent of the Spanish crown. Sixty-five
years later, Theodore Roosevelt, then governor of New York said of Wilkinson, “"In all our history, there is no more
despicable character."[15] While it can never be proven whether
Wilkinson was involved in the accident that nearly killed Wayne what has been
proven is that James Wilkinson was a traitor and an opportunist of the worst
kind.
On to Grand Glaize
When Wayne’s army
arrived at the Grand Glaize a few days later, they found it abandoned. Wayne had successfully driven a wedge between
the major Indian forces to the west at
Kekionga and those to the east near Detroit.
Construction began immediately on a new fort at the junction of the
Maumee and Auglaize Rivers and so confidant in the abilities of his army, Wayne
openly defied any challenges by naming his new fort, Fort Defiance.
With construction complete,
Wayne’s army started its march eastward along the north side of the Maumee
River. They advanced nearly forty miles
when spies informed Wayne that the enemy was only five miles to their front. Wayne immediately halted near a place called Roche
de Bout. [16] The men were told they would be advancing
quickly and to leave their backpacks extra clothing, blankets, anything that
would slow them down behind. The place was
called Camp Deposit.
One can only
imagine the range of emotions felt by the men that day when they got word that
they were finally about to go into battle. No doubt they ranged from fear to
anxiety to exhilaration and perhaps to some even a combination of all
three. They had been planning for this
day for over a year. The date, Wednesday
August 20th, 1794.
Rule #1 - Never Go Into Battle With an Empty Stomach
The army advanced
along the river and arrived at a clearing littered with fallen trees apparently
felled and uprooted by a tornado or huge windstorm that had passed through the
area.[17] Wayne’s force of 3000 regulars, militia,
and Indian spies immediately engaged the enemy force of 1500 being led by Blue
Jacket, Buckongahelis and Tecumseh.
Aside from being
outnumbered 2 to 1, the enemy was under another distinct disadvantage;
hunger. It was common practice among the
Indians to fast before a battle because if shot in the stomach with food in it,
there was a danger of infections.
Thinking Wayne’s army would arrive on the 19th the Indians
had not eaten for two days.
Thinking the
fallen trees would hinder the armies advance, instead, Wayne flanked them with
his cavalry while his infantry pushed on with fixed bayonets. The ensuing fight lasted only a few minutes. Wayne’s losses were 33 killed and 100
wounded. The enemy losses were 30 to 40
Indians and Canadians killed. The
number of enemy wounded remains unknown as those able to leave the field either
swam across the Maumee River or retreated along with the river back toward Ft.
Miami, the British fort 4 miles to the east.
Who Blinks First
Arriving back at
Ft. Miami, the retreating Indians were met with a very unpleasant
surprise. The gates were locked and they
were told to hide somewhere else. Angry and disgusted, many ran into the nearby
woods while others jumped into the river and swam to the opposite side. Meanwhile, Wayne was rushing headlong toward
the British post.
Even though the
war the United States and Great Britain had officially ended nine years
earlier, ill will and even hostile feelings still existed between the two
nations. The commander of the British
fort, Major William Campbell found himself facing a dilemma. He knew that any confrontation between his
men and the American force could very easily start a second war between the two
countries and the last thing he wanted was be to go down in history as being in
some way responsible for starting it.
Wayne, on the
other hand, had a proverbial ace in the hole.
Prior to leaving Ft. Greenville, he had received instructions from
Secretary Knox, telling him that if he (Wayne) deemed it necessary for the success
of the mission, he was authorized to “dislodge” the British from their
fort. He advised Wayne however that if
he did find it necessary, he should treat the enemy fairly and with dignity, while
at the same time cautioning him that if the effort failed, it could result in
“pernicious consequences,” inferring that failure could send a message that an
American army was not capable of defeating the Indians or their British allies,
something that greatly concerned Washington.
Knox’s letter to Wayne authorizing him to “dislodge” the enemy reads in
part:
“The occurrence of the
establishment of a new post (Ft. Miami) within our territory is of a nature not
to be embraced in the orders heretofore given you relatively to the respect to
be observed to the previously established posts of Great Britain. If therefore in the course of your operations
against the Indian enemy, it should become necessary to dislodge the party at
the Rapids[18] of the Miami you are
hereby authorized by the President of the United States to do it, taking care
after they shall be in your power to treat them with humanity and politeness
and to send them immediately to the nearest British garrison. But no attempt ought to be made unless it
shall promise complete success. An
unsuccessful attempt would be attended with pernicious consequences.”
Wayne and his men
spent the next several hours riding and parading around the walls of the fort,
taunting and hurling insults at the soldiers inside. Campbell, fearing one of his men might
retaliate and fire on the Americans, immediately issued orders that anyone
firing on the Americans would be put to death.
Campbell then sent a courier under a flag of truce with a letter to
General Wayne complaining that he (Wayne) was demonstrating an ungentlemanly
and un-officer like conduct. Wayne in
turn informed Campbell that Ft. Miami was on American soil and that he was
authorized by the United States government to “dislodge” him and his men from
it adding that if he did surrender the fort peacefully he and his men would be
allowed to return unharmed to Ft. Detroit.
Campbell, realizing he was at a distinct disadvantage informed Wayne
that it was not within his power to surrender the fort without authorization
from higher British officials.
Wayne knew that if
he attacked the fort and forced the British to abandon it, the Indians would
have viewed the British as brave fighters and martyrs despite the outcome. He also knew that if the British continued to
allow themselves to be taunted and humiliated for hours without any type of
retaliation, the Indians would view them as cowards, a character trait they
absolutely despised. After several
hours it became clear that the confrontation had come to a standstill. Wayne assembled his men and marched back to
Camp Deposit where they remained for several days. In the end, humiliation and embarrassment won
the day, not bullets and cannon fire.
On their way back
to Ft. Defiance his men destroyed all the cornfields, orchards and farms on
both sides of the river, some of which stretched for miles. The army remained at Ft. Defiance for a few
days before moving west to the Miami villages where they built another fort,
which Wayne named for himself, Fort Wayne.
The campaign had
been a complete success. The Americans
were now in control of two major strategic locations, one at the junction of
the Maumee and St. Marys River (Ft. Wayne) and the other at the junction of the
Maumee and Auglaize Rivers (Defiance).
In addition, Wayne’s actions at Ft. Miami had shown the Indians that the
British could no longer be depended on for support and protection. Plus, in their eyes, the British had shown
themselves to be cowards. Now with
their food supplies destroyed and winter coming on, the Indians had critical
decisions to make; fight on or sign a peace treaty with the Americans.
Winter 1794-95
The winter of
1794-95 was especially difficult for the Indians and their families as most of
their food supplies had been destroyed by Wayne’s army. During the long cold winter months, the
leaders of the various tribes met to talk about what course of actions they
needed to take. While many of the
younger warriors wanted to continue the fight, the older warriors, most of whom
had spent a greater part of their lives at war, were tired of the fighting, all
the bloodshed and the hardships. True,
they’d defeated Harmar’s expedition and annihilated St. Clair’s army, but now a
third army had attacked them, and this one it seems, was focused not simply on
defeating them, but wiping them off the face of the Earth. After months of talks, the harsh reality
finally sat in that they had no choice but to sign a peace treaty with the
Americans.
Negotiating for Real Estate on the Auglaize
Finally on August
3rd, 1795, leaders of the Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa Miami, Eel River, Wea, Chippewa, Potawatomi,
Kickapoo, Piankashaw, and Kaskaskia tribes met at Ft. Greenville and signed the
Greenville Treaty, officially bringing an end to warfare with the Indians in
the Northwest Territory. The treaty
called for ceding sixteen parcels of land to the United States. Among them a parcel listed in Article 3
Section 2 of the treaty, “a piece six miles square at the head of the
headwaters of the Auglaize River.” This was the area at the north end of the
portage from Loramie’s store to the old Tawa Town on the Auglaize, the area
Wayne had shown so much interest in his letters to the Secretary of War.
Wayne’s Fort on the Auglaize: Head of Auglaize
In letters from
General Wayne to the Secretary’s of War between December 2, 1793 and November
19, 1795, Wayne stated his desire to erect a post on the Auglaize River more than
nine times. He referred to the area as ”a piece six miles square at the head of the
headwaters of the Auglaize River” as one of the land parcels to be ceded to the
United States in the Greenville Treaty.
While Wayne did not specifically mention building anything at the site
in his Nov. 19th letter to Pickering, Pickering’s report submitted
to the Committee on Military Establishments on February 3, 1796 does.
In his report,
Pickering assigned the posts that Wayne had recommended be occupied into one of
eight divisions. Division 4 included 6
posts; Ft. Jefferson, Greenville, Recovery, Loramie’s Store, and “Head of Auglaize.”
[1] Legionville was located in
Harmony twp. Beaver County, Pennsylvania just west of the intersection of
Legionville road and Duff ave. GPS
coordinates for the site are: N40°37’16”W80°13’42
[2] The depth of the river increased
greatly in later years with the installation of several dams by the Army Corps
of Engineers.
[3] Thesite today is
approximately in the center of the Great American Ballpark in Cincinnai.
[4] Located at the intersection of Arch
and 4th street in downtown Cincinnati.
[5] Wikipedia.
(n.d.). St. Clairs Defeat. Retrieved 2013, from Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Clair%27s_Defeat
[6] Websters dictionary describes
Hobson’s Choice as “an apparently free
choice when there are no alternatives.”
The site today is at the intersection of Gest and w. 6th sts. in Cincinnati.
[7] A signal sounded on a
drum to summon soldiers to report to stations or to their quarters at night.
[8] Wikipedia. (n.d.). St. Clairs Defeat. Retrieved
2013, from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Clair%27s_Defeat
[9]
Ft. Loramie, Ohio
[10] At the junction of the Auglaize and
Maumee Rivers in Defiance, Ohio.
[12] Piqua, Ohio
[13] Wayne estimated the
distance from Loramies store to the spot on the Auglaize where he wanted to
build a post to be 21 miles. The “as the
crow flies” distance is 23 miles. He
estimated the distance from the area of John Johnsons home near Piqua to the
same spot on the Auglaize to be 35 miles.
Using the same measurement technique, the distance is 35 miles; same as
Wayne’s estimate.
[14] Fort Adams was located on
the east side of Rt. 127 and on the south bank of the St. Marys River.
[15] General James Wilkinson. (2013). Retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Wilkinson
Wikipedia. (n.d.). St. Clairs Defeat. Retrieved 2013,
from Wikipedia:
[16]Roche de Bout a large limestone
outcrop which forms and island near the center of the Maumee River 2 miles
south of Waterville, Ohio. It was a landmark for early explorers and natives.
The landmark was used by the Miami, Shawnee, Lenape and their allies as a
location for councils.
[17] The Battle of Fallen Timbers
actually occured across the road from
the Fallen Timbers State Park. The main
engagement took place in the field northwest of the interchange of SR 24 and I
475 west of Perrysburg, Ohio.
[18] The “Rapids of the Maumee” begins
just south of Waterville, Ohio. It is a
6 mile stretch of the Maumee River that is too shallow for boats. It is the same area as the Rouch-de-Bouf.
[19] Ultimo: in or of the month before the present
one. In this case the Sept 19th
(the previous month)
[20] Old Chillakothe. Located approx. 3 miles north of Xenia, Ohio
along Rt. 68.
[21] Erie Pennsylvania.
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