Saturday, December 31, 2022

Head of Auglaize - Part 3

Head of Auglaize - Part 3 

Chapter 3 

The following blog is one of a seriespresented to support my proposal that in 1794/95 General "Mad" Anthony Wayne constructed a post on the banks of the Auglaize River at or near the site of what later became Fort Amanda. He named his new post "Head of Auglaize."

NOTE:  Some of what you read in this first blog is  gleaned  from previous blogs and my first book; "Fort Amanda - A Historical Redress."  These are included to help create a timeline and continuity of events leading up to Wayne's decision to build his post on the Auglaize. 

Each blog will be presented as a separate "chapter" containing information on a topic relative to the overall proposal. All will be listed in the Blog Archive on the home page. If you miss or want to revisit a particular blog, simply click on the chapter you wish to read.

RECAP

1.  Wayne has orders to destroy the Indian villages at Kekionga (Fort Wayne, Ind.) 

2.   He comes to Ohio and builds Fort Greenville (Greenville, Oh.

3.  Wayne is trying to get the Indians to come to Greenville for peace talks  (no luck).  

4.  Wayne is also negotiating with contractors who will keep his troops supplied.

4.   Wayne’s concern is his army and supplies could get bogged down in the swamp,  .

5.  Wayne begins to look at using local rivers to transport his supplies.   

6.  This blog will cover Wayne's interest in the Auglaize River 


The Rivers

The St. Marys River

If you recall from previous blogs, Wayne's mission was to attack and destroy the Indin villages at Kekionga (Fort Wayne, Ind.).  He needed an alternative to land casrriage of supplies.  At Greenville he decided to see if local rivers were navigable enough to ship his supplies.  He had three large rivers to his south and north; the  The Great Miami, the St. Marys and the Auglaize.  One advantage of using  the St. Mary’s river was it flowed directly to the Miami villages.  A disadvantages is it was very difficult to navigate.  The St. Marys River  is very crooked and shallow in spots with  a very large number of bends and hairpin curves making it very difficult to navigate even in the spring and summer months.  It would be especially difficult particularly for boats loaded with heavy cargo.  In 1795 the trip from St. Marys to Defiance took seven days.


  

 

Another disadvantage of using the St. Marys River was it was prone to freezing.  This is evidenced in a letter from by Quartermaster Thomas Bodley, to General William Henry Harrison in Oct 1812 in which he described how ice had literally blocked the St Marys river for miles  and that supplies had to be unloaded and placed in shelters until conditions improved. 

Frozen In On the St. Marys  

“A messenger arrived with information that the last boats were stopped by the ice below this about 40 miles by water and about 12 by land that they had used every exertion but could proceed no further and in the Evening our express arrived from the first boats that they got to Shanes Crossing about 60 miles by water and 18 by land from this place where they were frozen up and no possibility of them getting on. There was no alternative left but to secure the craft and properly which Col. Barbee taken every necessary step to effect Captain Jordan’s company remain with the first boats and to build storehouses etc.  The roads are so extremely bad and the waters have been so high as to render it impossible for wagons or horses to travel.The St. Marys is so extremely crooked and blocked up with drift wood in many places where its out of the Bank and overflowed for miles in short terns. The slush has collected and frozen solid so as to dam it up for miles. Consequently nothing but a general thaw or hard rains can give us the benefit of the navigation of this stream.  The Auglaize is much straighter, has more water and will not freeze up as soon as the St. Marys”.


The Auglaize River

The major advantage of using the Auglaize River  was it flowed directly to Grand Glaize.   Another is as Bodley pointed out in his letter to Harrison, the Auglaize River was much straighter, had more water and wouldn't freeze up as soon as the  st. Marys.  

 Wayne's Sends Scouts to the Auglaize
  In late December (1793), General Wayne sent out a 15 man reconnisance party to look for a route from Greenville to the Auglaize River where the water was deep enough to support watercraft.  On January 2, 1794, the  group stumbled into a large Indian encampment.  Deciding it was too dangerous to retreat, attacked the camp.  Three soldiers and five Indian warriors killed in the fight and one soldier received a slight sholder wound.   The group returned to Fort Greenville the following day.  The ferocity of the fight is best described in Waynes report to Secretary Knox in which he described the clothing of the returning soldiers as “perforated by rifle balls.”    

A short time later Wayne sent out a second group to look for a portage portage route to the Auglaize,  not from Greenville this time, but from  from Loramie’s store.   The group returned the 18th of January and reported that not only had they found, a good portage route, they also a spot on the river where the water was deep enough for watercraft and it was only 22 miles from Loramie’s store.  Wayne referred to the site as  as the “north end of the portage.”   

During the same period Wayne dispatched two small boats manned by experienced river boatmen down the Great Miami from Loramie’s store to determine if indeed the river was  navigable from Cincinnati to Loramie’s store.   The boats left Loramie’s store on February 22nd and arrived at Fort Hamilton, the armys main supply depot north of Cincinnati  two days later (February 24th) The 110 river trip had taken only 2 days.



In Letter No. 70  Wayne estimated the distance from Loramies store to the "north end of the portage"  on the Auglaize where he wanted to build a post is actually 22 miles "as the crow flies."  

Wayne now had a river transport system that stretched from Fort Hamilton north of Cincinnati to Grand Glaize with only 22 miles of land carriage.  From his new post at Grand Glaize, boats could merge  into the Maumee River then  travel west to the Miami villages or east to Roche de Boeuf another major Indian stronghold 9 miles to the east.   The Auglaize route  to Grand Glaize was approximately 70 miles by water, compared to 170 mile using the St. Marys.  Plus, as Major Botts pointed out in his letter to Harrison in 1812, The Auglaize is much straighter, has more water and will not freeze up as soon as the St. Marys”.



Letter No. 73.  What Wayne needed now was a post at the north end of the portage.  On March 3rd, in his letter to Secretary Knox, Wayne wrote that he was “determined to build a strong post” on the banks of the Auglaize at the “north end of the portage.”  

He told Secretary Knox that he wanted a post on the Auglaize River because it would be almost imposible to keep troops supplied so far in advance of their supply base using only packhorses and wagons.  He added that building a post there would serve as a wake-up call to  the  Indians at Grand Glaize that his army was practically in their back yard.  He went on to say that he needed to act advance his army quickly to take possession of the gound at the north end of the portage as well  as taking advantage of the natural resources and foreage for his packhorses and cattle. 

 On the 20th of March he wrote:



Wayne's Auglaize Post Plans Put on Temporary Hold

In Knox letter No. 69, Knox tells Wayne that the British have built a post within American territory.  
Wayne

Game Changer - On to Fallen Timbers




 

[1] Bodley Family. Papers, 1773-1939.  Kentucky Historical Society.


 

Sunday, December 25, 2022

Head of Auglaize - Part 2


2.  "Mad" Anthony Wayne's Post on the Auglaize

Chapter 2

Note:  During the period letters exchanged between individuals were numbered.  That was done to ensure it had been received, i.e the individual received a letter with No. 75 and the next was No. 77, it indicated that No. 76 had either not been received yet or it was missing.

 A Change of Plans

General Wayne received his mission orders while in Philadelphia (1792): advance to the Miami villages at the junction of the St. Marys and St. Joseph Rivers (present day Fort Wayne, Ind.) destroy the villages, build a fort on the site and garrison it with at least 1500 troops.  A short time later, while still in Philadelpha, Secretary of War Knox wrote Wayne (Letter No. 3) to tell him that he had received reports that the Miami Villages had all but been abandoned and the Indians were gathering at Grand Glaize (Defiance, Oh).  

                             

Apparently the "good authority"  wasn't entirely correct abour the Miami villages being abandoned.  While the main encampment was all but abandoned, many of the groups simply scattered to the north while the majority went east toward Grand Glaize (Defiance, Oh).  

As you can see in Knox letter to Wayne (No. 64), the plan was still to go to the Miami villages and eliminate the resistance there.  If nothing else it should scare the indians enough to flee the area.  


Wayne had long suspected that in addition to the Miami villages, he would eventually have to confront the hostile tribes at Grand Glaize as well,   For or the moment however,  his main focus was on trying to persuade leaders of the hostile tribes to come to Ft. Greenville and negotiate a peace treaty.  He made several overtures for peace but his attempts were repeatedly met either with excuses or no response at all. As weeks passed, he became more and more frustrated, sensing the Indians were simply stalling for time so they could prepare for war and move their families to safety.  His hopes for a peace settlement were fading.  

Contractors

Another issue facing General Wayne was how to keep his troops supplied as the campaign progressed. This was normally done by civilian contractors.   Contractors tended to be both very  expensive. and notoriously unreliable,  Wayne knew his troops and wagon trains would be traveling through a very dense and dangerous swamp and he needed assurrances that his supply chain would be dependable. While negotiations were normally done by the quartermasters department, the issue of reliability was so critical to Wayne, he negotiated details himself  including a clause in the contract that any breach of contract would result in severe penalties and/or other conseuences.


The Great Black Swamp

 


The hardships of traversing through the Great Black Swamp can best be described by comments by early travelers who passed through it.   

As settlers traveled through the area they suffered from physical ailments; the humid wetness, the sucking mud, the darkness of the swamp forest, chills and fevers, malaria from mosquitoes, and difficult navigaion.  But trouble in the swamp was more than physical.  There was a nearly religious fear of the swamp.  As one settler remarked, "We read that God divided the land from water; but here is a place He forgot."  John Stilgoe writes of the fear of forests in folklore, describing ti as a "Great chaos, the lair of wild beasts and wilder men, where order and shaping are not, that would lure  hapless peasants into sinful schemes."  A solder lost his way in the swamp forest during the War of 1812 fearfully recalled teh swamp as "the home of Satan.

And Then There's The Rainy Season 

Transporting supplies overland through the swamp was going to be difficult enough during dry wether, what concerned Wayne most what conditions could be like during the rainy season.  His troops  and  wagon trains, artillery and other hevy equipment could easily bog down in the muck and mire of the swamp, causing delays, lost or damaged goods, something General Wayne absolurtly could not afford.  At this point he had only two opions; transport his supplies through the Great Black Swamp by oveland carriage or transport them through the Great Black Swamp by water and fortunately he had 3 available, the Great Miami, the St. Marys and the Auglaize Rivers.  The question is; if he was going to attack the Miami Villages and the St. Marys River flowed directly to it, why would he need the Auglaize River.    The story continues in Chp. 3



  



 


  





Sunday, December 18, 2022

Head of Auglaize - Part 1

 

1.  Anthony Wayne's Post on the Auglaize -Chp. 1


Proposal

The following series of blogs will be presented to support my proposal that in 1794/95 General "Mad" Anthony Wayne constructed a post on the banks of the Auglaize River at or near the site of what later became Fort Amanda. He named his new post "Head of Auglaize."

NOTE:  Some of what you read in this first blog is  gleaned  from previous blogs and my first book; "Fort Amanda - A Historical Redress."  These are included to help create a timeline and continuity of events leading up to Wayne's decision to build his post on the Auglaize. 

Each blog will be presented as a separate "chapter" containing information on a topic relative to the overall proposal. All will be listed in the Blog Archive on the home page. If you miss or want to revisit a particular blog, simply click on the chapter you wish to read.

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I'd like to go west into the Ohio Country but it's far far too dangerous

 

A Gruesome Gift

How dangerous was the Ohio country in the 1780s? During the 10-year period leading up to 1790, Indians, with the help of their British allies, had murdered over 1,500 settlers in Kentucky and along the north side of the Ohio River. On May 7, 1782, a British officer sent a letter to the British Governor of Canada, along with eight packages, containing the scalps of 983 men, women and children murdered by the Indians. While Indians did on occasion kidnap children and raise them as their own, as the inventory of scalps listed below shows that was not always the case.

Pkg. #1

 43

 Soldiers surprised at night and killed by bullets

Pkg. #2

 98

 Farmers killed in home in daylight protecting families

Pkg. #3

 97

 Farmers shot or killed by hatchet in their fields in daylight

Pkg. #4

102

Farmers young & old killed after torture of various types

Pkg. #5

88

Women scalped then killed or clubbed to death

Pkg. #6

193

Boys killed by knife, hatched or club

Pkg. #7

211

Girls killed by hatchet or scalping knife

Pkg. #8

151

A variety including a minister and 29 infants 

Total

983

 



1790

In 1790 George Washington decided it was time to put an end to the atrocities on the Ohio/Kentucky frontier.  He ordered 37-year-old General Josiah Harmar, a Revolutionary War veteran to organize and army with orders to advance to Kekionga, a large complex of Miami,  Shawnee and Delaware tribes at the junction of the St. Marys and St. Joseph Rivers and destroy them.  

General Josiah Harmar


  
           The Miami villages at Kekionga                    The site today  (Fort Wayne, Ind.

When Hardin and his men arrived at Kekionga, they found it deserted so they returned to the main encampment. Over the course of the next several days, Harmar’s men were constantly harassed by enemy sniper fire forcing them into small sporadic skirmishes, which created a critical shortage of ammunition for the soldiers.

Early in the morning of October 22, 1790, Harmar ordered Col. John Hardin to return to the Miami village and complete the destruction of the site. When  Hardin and his men arrived, they found themselves facing an Indian force of nearly 1,100 Indians. Being outnumbered almost 2 to 1; Hardin immediately dispatched a courier back to General Harmar pleading for reinforcements. Harmar who was reportedly drunk at the time, was visibly shaken by the news, and instead of sending reinforcements to Hardin, he panicked and ordered his men into a defensive position leaving Hardin and his men to fend for themselves. The ensuing fight was very costly for the Americans. Major Wyllys, one of Harmar’s key commanders, was killed along with 180 soldiers. A large number of others either were wounded or had deserted. The Indians’ casualties numbered between 120 and 150 killed. Feeling he could no longer continue the mission, Harmar retreated to Fort Washington[1], arriving there on November 3. Soon thereafter, he resigned his commission. While the losses his army suffered were significant, it paled in comparison to what was to happen next.



[1]  Fort Washington was located in Cincinnati, Ohio, near the intersection of 4th St. and Ludlow Ave.    

1791

The following year (1791) Washington ordered General Arthur St. Clair, a 54- year-old Scottish-born Revolutionary War General, then serving as governor of the Northwest Territory to  finish the work Harmar had failed to do, return to Kekionga, destroy it and establish a permanent military post there.  

General Arthur St. Clair

St. Clair's  original army was made up of 2000 mostly ill trained soldiers. By the time he left Cincinnati, illness, desertions and deferments had reduced it to less than 1,500.  By the time St. Clair's army reached the Wabash River (Fort Recovery, Ohio) on November 3, 1791, his force had been  reduced to only 920 officers and men and 200 contractors and camp followers.  Waiting for them was an enemy force of nearly1,400 Indian warriors.  St. Clairs misioned was doomed from the beginnning.  On the morning of Nov 4th, his army was attacked and the was catastropic.


While the exact number of Americans killed will never be known, the best estimates are that 632 officers and soldiers were killed outright or died on the battlefield and another 264 were wounded. Of the nearly 200 camp followers, children and contractors, nearly all were killed or kidnapped. Indian losses that day were estimated at only twenty-one killed and forty wounded. Of St. Clair’s 920-man force, only 24 men returned to Fort Washington unharmed. The Army’s casualty rate (killed and wounded) was a staggering 97% while the casualty rate of the Indians was less than 5 percent.  
The battle, known as St. Clair’s defeat, has gone down in history as the worst defeat of a United States Army at the hands of Native Americans. Nearly one-quarter of the entire United States Army had been slaughtered in a single three-hour battle. 

Our Nations Reputation on the World Stage

By 1792, the stakes had been raised considerably in terms of national security. Not only was there a major concern with the continuing Indian hostilities in the northwest, there was an equally growing concern that the disastrous campaigns of Harmar and St. Clair could create the impression that the United States was weak and incapable of dealing not only with her internal problems with the Indians, but equally incapable of defending herself against foreign powers as well. What the country needed was a victory and it was and it was about to get one a major one.

1792

By the spring of 1792, President Washington and Secretary of War Knox had re-structured the United States Army into what they called a “legion,” modeled in part from the ancient Roman legions. What they needed now was a battle-hardened General to lead it. Their choice - Anthony Wayne.  

General Anthony Wyne 

 Wayne had earned the nickname “Mad Anthony” from a bold nighttime bayonet-only attack on a British position during the Revolutionary War. Despite being outnumbered, his efforts proved successful and the victory provided a much-needed morale booster to the Continental army who was desperate for a victory of any kind. His fiery temper and unquestionable courage made him the logical choice to lead a new campaign. The 48-year-old Wayne came out of retirement and accepted the commission of Major General and Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army.  

 During the spring and summer months of 1792, Wayne assembled his army of 2,500 men at an encampment near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Needing a more suitable place to winter his troops, Wayne moved the camp twenty-two miles to the west on the banks of the Ohio River near present day Baden, Pennsylvania. He named the encampment Legionville.[1]  

Legionville  (1792-93)

During the winter months 1792-93, Legionville evolved from being a temporary encampment to a small city covering approximately 35 acres. It contained over 500 buildings, a parade ground for practicing maneuvers and a rifle range for target practice. By spring, the population of Legionville had grown to nearly five times that of nearby Pittsburgh.

Sadly on April 18, Mary Penrose Wayne, General Wayne’s wife of 27 years died at the age of 44 at their family home in Radnor, Pennsylvania. It was 320 miles from Legionville to Radnor and a trip to and from home would have taken several weeks.  Dates on letters sent from Wayne indicate that he remained at Legionville and as a result, it was nearly three years before he was able to return home and visit his wife’s grave.  

The Flotilla Departs

On April 30, 1793, the first boats pushed off heading west. The 464-mile journey by boat from Legionville to Cincinnati took six days, traveling an average of 77 miles a day. The boats landed near a swampy area a quarter mile southwest[2] of Fort Washington, Harmar’s base of operations in 1790.

Wayne’s operational plan called for floating his men and materials down the Ohio River on barges to Cincinnati, disembark, and then advance overland to the north. Contractors had been working for months building large flat bottom boats capable of carrying 40 men and able to navigate the shallow Ohio River. Sixty boats had been built to transport Wayne’s 2,500-man army and another eight designed to carry heavy artillery pieces, powder and shot. Riders and drivers for the supply trains, horses, cattle and forage were loaded onto twelve additional boats that had been built specifically for that purpose. Early on the morning of On April 30, 1793, the first boats pushed off heading west. The 464-mile journey by boat from Legionville to Cincinnati took six days, traveling an average of 77 miles a day. The boats landed near a swampy area a quarter mile southwest[2] of Fort Washington, Harmar’s base of operations in 1790.  Scouring the area, Wayne quickly determined that there was not enough open area between the fort and the Ohio River for his encampment. In addition, the area was too close to the lure of the temptations of the nearby town of Cincinnati with, as Wayne put it, “its ardent poison and caitiff wretches to dispose of it. He finally decided on an area of high ground a mile west of Fort Washington and named his new encampment appropriately enough - Hobson ’s Choice.[3]

During the months of April – August 1793, Wayne’s men spent their days practicing battle formations and of course, target practice. In addition, recruits were reminded of the consequences of desertion and cowardice. On the morning of September 17 the men took down their tents, loaded their personal baggage onto wagons and at the beating of the tattoo[4] formed into columns and began their march north out of town following the same trail Harmar and St. Clair’s armies had taken years earlier. By the middle of October, the army had advanced 70 miles north where it stopped and began construction of a fort and made plans to winter in place. The finished fort covered sprawling 55 acres and was the largest wooden fortification ever built in the United States. Wayne named his new fort, Fort Greenville, in honor of his friend Nathaniel Green.

 
                            Fort Greenville                                                              Overlay




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(NEXT CHAPTER)

Site of Hobson’s Choice

  Decisions, decisions, decisions




[1] Legionville was located in Harmony twp. Beaver County, Pennsylvania just west of the intersection of Legionville road and Duff Ave.  GPS coordinates for the site are: N40°37’16”W80°13’42

[2] The site today is the center of the Great American Ballpark in Cincinnati.

[3] Websters dictionary describes Hobson’s Choice as, “an apparently free choice when there are no alternatives.”  The site today is at the intersection of Gest and west. 6th Sts. in Cincinnati.

[4] A signal sounded on a drum to summon soldiers to report to stations or to their quarters at night.

 

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Thursday, October 27, 2022

His Battle Made Custer's Battle Look Like a Small Skirmish

 

 


Gen. Arthur St. Clair
(1737 – 1818)

 Before reading any further, click on the link below and turn up your sound

 St. Clairs Defeat   (Click on this link)

During the 10-year period(1780-17 , 90) Indians, with the help of their British allies, had murdered over 1,500 settlers in Kentucky and along the north side of the Ohio River.  An expedition led by General Josiah Harmar was given the mission of marching his men to Kekionga (Fort Wayne, Ind), and destroying the major Miami village complex there.   While his campaign was  a disaster it paled in comparison to what happened to the next army sent to Kekionga.

President Washington called on Arthur St. Clair, a 54- year-old Scottish-born Revolutionary War General, then serving as governor of the Northwest Territory to lead an army, return to Kekionga, destroy it and establish a permanent military post there. St. Clair was told he would be facing an enemy force of about 2,000 Indians led by Chief Blue Jacket of the Shawnee and Chief Little Turtle of the Miami along with a number of their British and Canadian allies. While he was told that he would be leading a 3,000 man army, he received only 2,000 and many of those individuals were either ill trained, poorly equipped or both. Also traveling with the army was a contingent of camp followers[1] and civilian contractors totaling another 200, half of whom were women and children. By late September, illness, deaths and desertions had reduced the size of his army from 2,200 to a total of 1,486.[2] St. Clair had no way of knowing it, but his army was already doomed.

In early October 1791, St. Clair’s army marched 30 miles northward and established Fort Hamilton on the east bank of the Great Miami River[3]. Once completed, they advanced another 45 miles where they halted and built Fort Jefferson. During construction, three men deserted. This had been an ongoing problem for St. Clair since leaving Fort Washington so when two of the three deserters were captured he had them hanged as a deterrent to others.

 

Meanwhile Little Turtle and Blue Jacket had been waiting patiently at Kekionga expecting an attack from St. Clair. Growing impatient, the two war chiefs decided to move their force of over 1,000 warriors southeast, hoping to intercept and engage the American force before they reached Kekionga. By the time the Indian forces reached the Wabash their number had grown to 1,400.

On November 3, 1791, St. Clair and his army arrived and set up camp on the banks of what he thought was the St. Marys River and within 20 miles striking distance of his objective. In reality, he was not camped on the St. Marys River; he was camped on the Wabash River and not within 20 miles of his objective, but rather 50 miles from his objective. The march had taken 47 days and during that time another 366 soldiers either died or deserted, an average of 8 per day. Apparently, hanging had not been a deterrent for desertion. The size of St. Clair’s force now stood at 1,120 (868 soldiers, 52 officers and 200 camp followers) nearly half its original size. Put into perspective, St. Clairs 920 soldiers were about to come face to face with 1,400 Indian warriors.

The weather was colder than normal for that time of year in Ohio and the ground was covered with a light blanket of snow. As St. Clair’s men slept, the enemy quietly encircled their camp and went into cold camp - meaning no fires were to be built. Each warrior covered himself in blankets and furs and lay on the cold ground in absolute silence waiting for the word to attack the following morning. Scattered gunshots were heard throughout the night but were dismissed as overreaction by nervous sentries.

The Hounds of Hell Are Released[4]

At 7:15 am, Friday, November 4, 1791, blood-curdling screams rang out from the surrounding woods as more than 1,400 warriors poured into the encampment from every direction, killing everyone and everything in sight including horses, cattle, men, women and children. The Indians quickly identified and killed the officers first in order to create confusion among the soldiers. So effective was this tactic that within the first few minutes, over half of the forty-three officers either were killed outright or lay dying on the ground. Survivors later described men standing around dazed, wandering around and confused as to what to do. Some threw their muskets down hoping to surrender only to be tomahawked and murdered where they stood. Survivors told stories of seeing younger soldiers, their first time in combat, standing motionless and confused, and some crying for their mothers. It was total pandemonium.

In just a matter of a few minutes, the cold air mixed with the acrid smoke from the muskets and cannon made seeing objects a few feet away virtually impossible. St. Clair, who suffered with severe gout was in constant pain at the time and had to be lifted onto his horse. Almost immediately, the horse was shot through the head, killing it instantly throwing St. Clair to the ground. The General shouted for another horse and as the soldier was rushing toward him with the second horse; both the man and animal were shot down. Screaming frantically for a third horse, St. Clair was hoisted into the saddle where he began yelling orders. At one point, a bullet passed so close to his head that it cut off a lock of his hair. A later examination found that eight bullets had passed through his clothing during the battle. Those individuals too injured to move or frozen by fear were murdered on the spot. Others huddled together in small groups and were shot down like animals herded into a slaughtering pen.

An artillery crew tried to turn its guns in the direction of the main body of Indians but snipers killed most of the gun crew forcing the others to spike[5] the cannon and abandon it. One survivor recalled years later that one of the scenes he remembered most vividly was seeing what he thought were pumpkins with steam rising from them. When the smoke cleared, he realized what he was actually seeing was the scalped heads of the gun crew and the steam was the heat vapor rising from the top of the scalped heads. The attack had been fast and complete, killing everyone assigned to the gun. The battle raged on for two and one-half hours with an American killed an average of every 10 seconds. Around 9:45 am, sensing imminent annihilation, St. Clair screamed orders to what was left of his army to retreat to Fort Jefferson, 30 miles to the south.

 

To help open a path for the retreating amy, Colonel William Darke ordered his men to fix bayonets and charge the main Indian position. The Indians retreated to the woods but as Darke’s men continued after them, the Indians fell in behind and killed many of them. Warriors ran after the retreating soldiers for two miles killing those too slow or too wounded to keep up with the others. Some soldiers removed their bayonets and stuck them in the ground pointing backwards toward the enemy, hoping it would slow them down.[6]

By 10 o’clock that morning, most of the smoke from the muskets and cannons had cleared. Survivors described the battlefield as absolute carnage. Dead and mutilated bodies of hundreds of soldiers, women, children, horses and pack animals littered the ground. Many of the women’s bodies had been mutilated in the most heinous ways and young children were swung by the legs bashing their heads against trees, literally knocking their brains out. The warriors continued their gruesome work of stripping the dead and dying of valuables such as warm winter clothing, muskets, pistols, swords, knives, powder horns, tents, pots, pans, utensils and other camp materials.

On November 8, St. Clair’s army, or what was left of it, staggered back into Fort Washington[7]. For the next several days, the General worked on his report to the Secretary of War outlining details of the battle. He finished it on November 18 and the following morning dispatched a courier with instructions to carry it to Secretary of War Knox in Philadelphia. The courier arrived in Philadelphia a month later on December 19 and delivered the report to Knox. The following day, Knox met with President Washington who was having dinner with friends at the time. The two men adjourned to a separate room where Knox informed Washington of the disaster. Knox later wrote that Washington returned to his dinner guests where he retained his composure throughout the rest of the evening but when the guests left, he “unleashed his rage.”[8] He purportedly shouted to his secretary “St. Clair allowed that army to be cut to pieces, butchered, tomahawked by surprise. How can he answer to his country? The curse of widows and children is upon him.” [9] The following month, St. Clair traveled to Philadelphia to give his account of what had happened. Blaming the quartermaster as well as the War Department, St. Clair asked for a court-martial hoping he would be exonerated, after which he would resign his commission. Washington not only denied St. Clair’s request for a court-marshal, he demanded his resignation effective immediately.[10]

                      The Aftermath

The battle, known as St. Clair’s defeat, has gone down in history as the worst defeat of a United States Army at the hands of Native Americans. Nearly one-quarter of the entire United States Army had been slaughtered in a single three-hour battle. While the exact number of killed will never be known, the best estimates are that 632 officers and soldiers were killed outright or died on the battlefield and another 264 were wounded. Of the nearly 200 women, children and contractors, at least 50 of the women weer killed and the number of children killed is unknown.  Three spots were identified where prisoners were tortured and burned at the stake.  Indian losses that day were estimated at only twenty-one killed and forty wounded. Of St. Clair’s 920-man force, only 24 men returned to Fort Washington unharmed. The Army’s casualty rate (killed and wounded) was a staggering 97% while the casualty rate of the Indians was less than 5 percent.

In February 1792, nearly 3 months after the battle, General Wilkinson, ordered Captain Robert Buntin to assemble a detachment of men and return to St. Clair’s battlefield to look for salvageable materials and to bury the dead, or at least what remained of them. In his report to Wilkinson, Buntin wrote:

In my opinion, those innocent men who fell into the enemy’s hands with life were used with the greatest torture, having their limbs torn off; and the women have been treated with the most indecent cruelty having stakes as thick as a person’s arm driven through their bodies.  The first I observed when burying the dead and the latter was discovered by Col Sergeant and Dr Brown.  We found three whole carriages (cannon); the other five were so much damaged that they were rendered useless.  By the general’s orders, pits were dug in different places and all the dead bodies that were exposed to view or could be conveniently found (the snow being very deep) were buried.  Six hundred skulls were found and the flesh was entirely off the bones and in many cases the sinews yet held them together. 

Accompanying Buntin was a man named Sergeant who wrote in his report:

I was astonished to see the amazing effect of the enemy’s fire.  Every twig and bush seems to be cut down, and the saplings and trees marked with the utmost profusion of shot.”

By 1792, the stakes had been raised considerably in terms of national security. Not only was there a major concern with the continuing Indian hostilities in the northwest, there was an equally growing concern that the disastrous campaigns of Harmar and St. Clair could create the impression that the United States was weak and incapable of dealing not only with her internal problems with the Indians, but equally incapable of defending herself against foreign powers as well. What the country needed was a victory and it was and it was about to get one a major one.   Leading it was General Anthony Wayne and he successfully defeated the Indians in 1794 at the Battle of Fallen Timbers near Maumee, Ohio.

              Put into a Gruesome Perspective

For my neighbors, laid end to end, the bodies of the fallen would have measured 4,784 feet (3/4 of the distance around the loop) .  Custers would have measured 1541 feet


 


[1] Camp followers were civilians who traveled with the army and provided services to soldiers, the army did not, including such things as laundresses, cooks, prostitutes, liquor, writing paper, ink, etc.

[2] http://military.wikia.com/wiki/St._Clair%27s_Defeat

[3] Hamilton, Ohio.  The fort was located on the south bank of the Great Miami River where High St. crosses.

[4] The artwork of the battle was created by Peter Dennis and is found in the book, “Wabash 1791 St. Clair’s defeat” by John F. Winkler (Osprey Publishing).  

[5] Spiking involved shoving a metal rod or bayonet tips down into the primer hole of the cannon and breaking it off in the hole thus making it impossible to fire the piece.

[6] John Winkler’s Book, “Wabash 1791 – St. Clair’s Defeat,” is a must reading for those interested in the events leading up to the battle and in a minute by minute account of the battle itself.

[7] Cincinnati, Ohio.

[8] http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Clair%27s_Defeat

[9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Arthur_St._Clair

[10] Artwork created by Peter Dennis and published by Osprey Publishing.